

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
City of Chicago



REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL:

***ADVISORY CONCERNING THE
INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY'S
REPORTING OF USE-OF-FORCE INCIDENTS***

JULY 2016



Joseph M. Ferguson
Inspector General

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL *City of Chicago*

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VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

July 01, 2016

Sharon Fairley
Chief Administrator
Independent Police Review Authority
1615 West Chicago Avenue
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Eileen Mitchell
Chief of Staff
Office of the Mayor
121 North LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602

Dear Chief Administrator Fairley and Chief of Staff Mitchell:

The City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) has determined that the public reporting by the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) on the Chicago Police Department's (CPD) use of force prior to 2015 was inaccurate and incomplete, and that IPRA could improve its reporting procedures to provide meaningful transparency, improve accountability, build public trust, and, ultimately, bolster public safety.¹

OIG determined that the numbers provided in the Authority's quarterly reporting on its investigations of CPD weapon discharges did not match the number of actual incidents for any weapon type during the time periods reviewed.² As a result, the reports did not provide a sufficient basis for a complete and, and therefore meaningful, assessment of changes over time in CPD's use of force. Moreover, during the time periods reviewed, IPRA did not follow best practices for use-of-force reporting. The Authority did not articulate a clear purpose for its public reporting, it unduly relied on Municipal Code of Chicago (MCC) reporting requirements, and it oriented its reporting around its own investigations rather than striving to provide a truly comprehensive overview of CPD's use of force. As a result, the quality of the use-of-force data

¹ The OIG inquiry that is subject of this advisory covered IPRA reporting from 2007 to 2014. The inquiry began as an audit. In light of the structural oversight reforms recently proposed by the Mayor, however, OIG transitioned to an advisory to provide the City with our suggestions in a more timely manner.

² OIG assessed the accuracy and completeness of IPRA's quarterly weapons-discharge reporting during the tenure of two former Chief Administrators. It should be noted that, as explained later in the report, while CPD is required to notify IPRA of incidents involving discharges of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray, IPRA is not required to investigate those incidents.

reported by IPRA was less useful than it otherwise could have been, even when considering the areas in which it exceeded the minimal categorical requirements of the MCC.

During this historic moment of transformation of police oversight in Chicago, the City should recognize that use-of-force reporting is a crucial tool for meaningful transparency, accountability, and the fostering of public trust in the police department and the agency responsible for police oversight. To maximize the effectiveness of this tool, the City must articulate a clear vision of the purpose of use-of-force reporting, and provide the resources required to issue accurate and robust reports, including unfettered access to the relevant data.

I. POLICE USE OF FORCE IN CHICAGO

Law enforcement agencies possess the unique authority to use force for the purpose of protecting the public welfare.³ CPD's Use of Force Model guides its members' actions, stating, "[t]he primary objective of the use of force model is to ensure control of a subject with the reasonable force necessary based on the totality of the circumstances."⁴ Use of force includes a range of potential tactics, from basic physical contact, such as strong grip holds, to the discharge of firearms.⁵ In exchange for entrusting CPD members with the authority to use force, the public acquires a right to know when this authority is used. Although IPRA reports on its investigations into CPD member weapon discharges, the City provides no comprehensive reports on CPD's use of force. Many types of incidents included in CPD's Use of Force Model are categorically excluded from IPRA's reports, and important contextual information is not reported. The MCC neither requires nor precludes comprehensive use-of-force reporting by IPRA, CPD, or any other entity.

A. The Role of the Independent Police Review Authority

In 2007, the Chicago City Council created IPRA to serve as an independent oversight agency, replacing CPD's former Office of Professional Standards. MCC § 2-57-040 requires IPRA to investigate "all cases in which a department member discharges his or her firearm, stun gun, or Taser in a manner which potentially could strike an individual, even if no allegation of misconduct is made." In addition, IPRA investigates certain types of complaints against CPD members, reviews legal settlements involving police misconduct, and makes policy recommendations designed to increase the efficiency of CPD.⁶

MCC § 2-57-110 requires IPRA to issue reports on a quarterly basis summarizing the number of investigations initiated, pending, and concluded in each quarter.⁷ From September 2007 through December 2015, IPRA included in each of its quarterly reports a table designed to fulfill this

³ U.S. Department of Justice, "Principles for Promoting Police Integrity," January 2001, 3, accessed June 1, 2016, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf>.

⁴ See CPD's *Use of Force Model* in Appendix A.

⁵ City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, "General Order G03-02-02 Force Options," January 1, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-1d970b87782d543f.pdf?hl=true>.

⁶ MCC § 2-57-040(e), MCC § 2-57-040(i), and MCC § 2-57-110.

⁷ This requirement covers IPRA's investigations into certain types of complaints against CPD members. This advisory does not address the accuracy of IPRA's reporting of complaint investigations.

requirement.⁸ In these reports, IPRA also provided information not specifically required by the MCC by categorizing the initiated investigations by incident type.⁹ IPRA reported five categories of weapons-discharge investigations: Hit Shooting, Non-Hit Shooting, Shooting/Animal, Taser, and Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Discharges.¹⁰ Although IPRA went beyond its MCC reporting requirements, the quarterly reports remained focused solely on its investigative activities; the Authority did not address CPD's use-of-force practices.¹¹

B. The Chicago Police Department's Use-of-force Documentation

CPD General Orders require notification of IPRA each time a CPD member discharges a firearm, uses a Taser, or discharges OC.¹² Once notified, IPRA creates an electronic record of its investigation by assigning each incident a log number in CPD and IPRA's electronic case management system (CLEAR). During the time periods we reviewed in preparing this advisory, IPRA identified the investigations included in its quarterly reports by using its own internal records of incident notifications received from CPD.

CPD members document use-of-force incidents, including all incidents in which a member discharges a weapon, by completing a Tactical Response Report (TRR).¹³ TRRs—copies of which CPD provides to IPRA—capture detailed information on the characteristics of such incidents, including the time and location, descriptions of subject and officer actions, descriptions of weapons involved, accounts of the reasons for the use of force, and assessments

⁸ See, for example, the table labeled "IPRA Cumulative Figures" on page 6 of IPRA's 4Q-2015 quarterly report. City of Chicago, Independent Police Review Authority, "Quarterly Report: October 1, 2015 – December 31, 2015," January 15, 2016, accessed June 16, 2016, http://www.iprachicago.org/content/dam/ipra/Documents/Quarterly_Reports/2016-01-19QuarterlyReport.pdf

⁹ See, for example, the table labeled "IPRA Investigations Opened by Incident Type" on page 8 of IPRA's 4Q-2015 quarterly report. City of Chicago, Independent Police Review Authority, "Quarterly Report: October 1, 2015 – December 31, 2015," January 15, 2016, accessed June 16, 2016, http://www.iprachicago.org/content/dam/ipra/Documents/Quarterly_Reports/2016-01-19QuarterlyReport.pdf

¹⁰ Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) is commonly referred to as pepper spray. In the absence of a complaint, IPRA is not required to investigate OC discharges, but (as discussed later in this report) CPD is required to notify IPRA anytime a CPD member discharges an OC device.

¹¹ IPRA also voluntarily published single-page Officer Involved Shooting and Officer Involved Tasing statistical reports summarizing the number of subjects involved and their demographic information, as well as the number of fatalities that resulted from these incidents. OIG's review did not test the accuracy and completeness of these statistical reports. OIG did, however, discover several instances where there was a discrepancy between the number of investigations reported in IPRA's quarterly reports and its statistical reports. IPRA's reports are available online: http://www.iprachicago.org/ipra/homepage/PublicationPress/archived_reports/quarterly_report_2015.html.

¹² City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, "General Order G03-02-06 Firearms Discharge Incidents Involving Sworn Members," October 30, 2014, accessed June 6, 2016, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12bf3509-a8c12-bf4a-19387ee3b460c202.pdf?hl=true>, and City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, "General Order G03-02-07 Other Weapon Discharge Incidents," October 30, 2014, accessed June 6, 2016, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b73-14961edb-42314-9620-2d3bbb0f180e2d00.pdf?hl=true>.

¹³ Weapon discharges during Department-sponsored firearms training or practice, firearms practice at recognized range facilities, Department-authorized ballistic examination or testing, and licensed hunting activities are exempted from the TRR requirement unless personal injury or property damage occurred. See City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, "General Order G03-02-05 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report," October 2014, accessed July 14, 2016, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-1291da66-88512-91e2-cdd76fd8ae76d83d.pdf?hl=true>.

of whether the use of force complied with CPD policy.¹⁴ Because TRRs contain a wealth of information describing use-of-force incidents, they are an important resource for both use-of-force investigations and reporting.

II. IPRA’S PUBLIC REPORTING OF WEAPONS-DISCHARGE DATA WAS INACCURATE AND INCOMPLETE

OIG evaluated the accuracy and completeness of IPRA’s quarterly weapons-discharge reporting by examining an inventory of weapons-discharge incidents compiled from both IPRA investigative data and CPD use-of-force data. OIG then compared that inventory to weapons-discharge data summarized in IPRA’s quarterly reports. OIG’s review included Hit and Non-Hit Shooting investigations published in IPRA’s quarterly reports from September 2007 through September 2014, and Shooting/Animal, Taser, and OC Discharge investigations from October 2013 through September 2014.¹⁵

As shown in the tables below, IPRA’s reported weapons-discharge data did not match the number of actual incidents¹⁶ in any category during the time periods reviewed.¹⁷ In the “Discrepancy” column, we indicate where IPRA over reported with a “+” and where IPRA under reported with a “-.” For a quarterly comparison, see Appendix B.

Hit and Non-Hit Firearm Discharge Investigations, September 2007 – September 2014 (85 months)

	IPRA Reported	Actual Incidents	Discrepancy
Hit Shootings ¹⁸	344	340	+4
Non-Hit Shootings	291	340	-49

Source: OIG analysis of IPRA’s quarterly reports and CPD use-of-force data.

Other Weapons-Discharge Investigations, October 2013 – September 2014 (12 months)

	IPRA Reported	Actual Incidents	Discrepancy
Shooting/Animal	63	64	-1
Taser	379	411	-32
OC Discharge	7	126	-119

Source: OIG analysis of IPRA’s quarterly reports and CPD use-of-force data.

¹⁴ City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, “CPD-11.377 Tactical Response Report,” n.d., accessed June 13, 2016, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.377.pdf>

¹⁵ Due to data quality issues, OIG’s comparison of actual and reported incidents necessitated prolonged manual review. In order to complete our analysis and provide suggestions in a timely manner, OIG prioritized its review of reported Hit and Non-Hit Shootings and limited its review of Shooting/Animal, Taser, and OC Discharge incidents to a one-year period.

¹⁶ OIG used CPD TRR data as the primary source to identify “actual incidents,” meaning the true number of weapons-discharge incidents. Due to data quality issues, however, OIG could not determine the number of incidents relying solely on this source. Therefore, OIG cross-referenced CPD TRR data with IPRA investigation data, utilizing the comparison to identify an inventory of unique incidents.

¹⁷ IPRA investigates incidents and reports on those investigations. Any incident involving multiple officers or subjects is counted only once in IPRA’s quarterly reports.

¹⁸ OIG excluded two incidents in which a CPD member fired a beanbag munition from a shotgun. IPRA stated that it does not categorize the use of the tactic as a firearm discharge.

This sort of inaccurate and incomplete reporting may erode public trust in the ability of a civilian oversight agency to hold police accountable. In addition, such inaccuracies hamper the efforts of internal and external users of IPRA's quarterly reports to analyze any changes in CPD's use of force over time.

Because IPRA did not maintain sufficiently detailed records to allow accurate replication of its past reports, in most cases neither OIG nor IPRA could identify which particular incidents were or were not reported. Nevertheless, OIG identified three operational deficiencies as the likely causes of the discrepancies shown above:

- IPRA lacked clear and consistent policies and procedures for classifying weapons-discharge incidents in its quarterly reports. For example, because IPRA had no clear policy regarding the classification of firearm discharges involving animals, materially identical incidents were sometimes classified as Shooting/Animal and other times as Non-Hit Shooting.
- IPRA lacked database-level access to its own data, and therefore was incapable of revising its current reporting classifications and/or reporting single incidents in multiple categories. If IPRA desired to adjust its reporting to reflect best practices (discussed in Section B below), it would be unable to do so. Relatedly, IPRA's incomplete understanding of how its data was stored impeded its ability to generate accurate and complete reports.
- IPRA relied on CPD notification processes, and made no attempt to verify that the Department provided all of the required weapons-discharge notifications. During OIG's inquiry, IPRA was unable to provide notification records for 6 Non-Hit shootings, 14 Taser incidents, and 111 OC discharges that occurred during the time periods reviewed. Either CPD failed to notify IPRA of the incidents, or IPRA failed to properly record the notifications. In any event, OIG found no evidence that IPRA investigated the incidents.

III. IPRA'S PUBLIC REPORTING OF WEAPONS-DISCHARGE DATA DID NOT FOLLOW BEST PRACTICES FOR USE-OF-FORCE REPORTING.

Public reporting is an important element of transparency, accountability, and efforts to improve police-community relations. Releasing data to the public promotes transparency, which, in turn, improves accountability, increases public confidence in law enforcement, and, ultimately, bolsters public safety. In addition to evaluating the accuracy and completeness of IPRA's quarterly reports, OIG spoke to subject matter experts, who identified three practices the City could adopt to improve its use-of-force reporting. Specifically, these experts recommend that use-of-force reporting: a) reflect the full range of a police department's range of force options, b) define use-of-force categories in a clear and consistent manner, and c) provide a level of contextual detail that is sufficient to allow accurate trend analysis. OIG found that IPRA's public reports during the time periods reviewed fell short of these best practices in the following ways:

- IPRA's public reporting omitted important use-of-force categories. For instance, CPD General Order G03-02-02 identifies a spectrum of force options, ranging from pain compliance techniques such as armbars and wristlocks to lethal uses of force such as chokeholds and firearms. However, IPRA's quarterly reports did not document or track

any use of force beyond the five categories identified above.¹⁹ The subject matter experts OIG consulted stated that, in order to comprehensively reflect the range of force options, a police department's public use-of-force reporting should align comprehensively with a police department's use-of-force policies in order to fully reflect the range of force options.

- IPRA's public reporting placed into single categories readily distinguishable types of incidents. For example, the Authority's Hit and Non-Hit Shooting categories included accidental discharges. The subject matter experts OIG consulted stated that it is critical to define use-of-force categories clearly and consistently in order to draw appropriate distinctions between dissimilar incidents and facilitate meaningful pattern analysis. Unintentional firearm discharges should be reported separately from Hit and Non-Hit shootings, because they are likely to have different causes and require different types of remedial measures. For the same reason, intentional discharges should be categorized as either tactical or non-tactical.²⁰ The New York City Police Department's *2014 Annual Firearms Discharge Report*, for example, distinguishes between Intentional and Unintentional Firearm Discharges, and includes separate categories for intentional discharges made without proper legal justification, as well as those resulting from non-conflict situations and animal attacks.
- IPRA's public reporting provided insufficient contextual detail. CPD's TRRs capture important contextual information, such as the subject's actions, the distance between the reporting member and the alleged offender, and whether the member was in uniform. The subject matter experts OIG consulted stated that including this type of information can promote accountability by allowing the identification of trends revealing the need to change policies, training, tactics, or equipment. The Los Angeles Police Department's *2015 Use of Force Year-End Review*, for example, distinguishes between shooting incidents where officers discharged their firearms because they incorrectly perceived the alleged offender was armed and incidents where the alleged offender was verified to have a firearm.²¹

These deficiencies in IPRA's reports impeded the ability of internal and external users to evaluate CPD's use-of-force practices. For example, because IPRA did not separate intentional from unintentional shootings, one could not discern from the Authority's quarterly report the number of incidents in which a CPD member purposefully fired a firearm at another person. IPRA management never considered addressing these deficiencies because it viewed mere compliance with MCC requirements as the primary purpose of its quarterly reports. As a result,

¹⁹ For example, IPRA did not report on CPD's use of impact munitions (i.e., beanbags fired from a shotgun) in its quarterly reports of firearm discharges. See City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, "General Order G03-02-02 Force Options," January 1, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-1d970b87782d543f.pdf?hl=true>.

²⁰ See New York City Police Department, Reports and Information, "2014 Annual Firearms Discharge Report," October 2015, accessed July 13, 2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/nypd_annual_firearms_discharge_report_2014V3.pdf.

²¹ See Los Angeles Police Department, "2015 Use of Force Year-End Review," n.d., accessed July 13, 2016, <http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Use%20of%20Force%20Review-Final.pdf>.

IPRA focused on reporting its own investigations rather than providing a complete depiction of CPD's use of force.

IV. OIG SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPREHENSIVE USE-OF-FORCE REPORTING

As explained above, public reporting on use-of-force incidents promotes transparency, which, in turn, improves accountability, increases public confidence in law enforcement, and, ultimately, bolsters public safety. Therefore, OIG suggests that the Mayor's Office designate an appropriate agency to fulfill this reporting function, and ensure the agency has sufficient resources to produce robust reports that accurately track CPD's use of force over time. Rather than merely summarizing investigations, the reports produced by this agency should also describe use-of-force incidents in a manner that aligns with CPD's Use of Force Model, distinguishes between dissimilar incidents, and categorizes incidents based on the pertinent contextual factors.

To ensure the accuracy of reporting, the City should,

- develop clear policies and procedures for classifying use-of-force incidents;
- develop a system to ensure the reporting agency has independent and ready access to all use-of-force data;
- improve its current IT practices and conduct a cost-benefit analysis of its current case management system to determine whether it meets operational needs; and
- maintain detailed records of all incidents summarized in its quarterly reporting.

V. CONCLUSION

The Mayor has pledged to rebuild public trust in and restore accountability to CPD by fundamentally reshaping the structure of police oversight in the City of Chicago.²² This reorganization mission represents a historic opportunity for the City. To make the most of this opportunity, the City must both articulate a clear vision for the purpose of public reporting and ensure the availability of the resources required to issue accurate and robust reports, including unfettered access to the necessary data.

OIG invites the City to respond in writing by July 19. Any such response will be made public together with this OIG Advisory.

Respectfully,



Joseph M. Ferguson
Inspector General
City of Chicago

cc: Eddie Johnson, Superintendent, CPD


²² Rahm Emanuel, "Op-Ed; Mayor Emanuel: Our Next Steps on Road to Police Reform," *Chicago Sun-Times*, May 13, 2016, accessed June 1, 2016, <http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/mayor-emanuel-our-next-steps-on-road-to-police-reform/>.

VI. APPENDIX A: CPD USE OF FORCE MODEL

CPD General Order G03-02-01 depicts the Department's Use of Force Model,²³ which provides guidance on the appropriate levels of force to be used by CPD members in response to particular situations.²⁴ We provide that depiction on the following page.

²³ City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, "General Order G03-02-01 The Use of Force Model," May 16, 2012, accessed June 1, 2016, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fff-cec11383d806e05f.pdf?hl=true>.

²⁴ CPD General Order G03-02-02 ("Force Options") provides Department members with more detailed guidance on the various force options referenced in the Use of Force Model. City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, "General Order G03-02-02 Force Options," January 1, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-9001-1d970b87782d543f.pdf?hl=true>.



VII. APPENDIX B: QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF IPRA REPORTING DISCREPANCIES

The tables on the following pages compare weapons-discharge investigations reported by IPRA to the number of actual incidents identified by OIG using CPD data. In addition to the operational deficiencies discussed above in Section II, IPRA's practice of reporting investigations on the basis of the date the Authority received notification rather than the date the incident occurred resulted in further inconsistencies between IPRA's records and OIG's inventory of actual incidents. These inconsistencies may be attributable to either CPD delaying notification or IPRA recording a notification date incorrectly.

	Hit Shootings		
	IPRA Reported	Actual Incidents	Discrepancy
Sept. 2007	4	4	0
Q4-2007	7	7	0
Q1-2008	8	7	+1
Q2-2008	15	15	0
Q3-2008	14	14	0
Q4-2008	14	14	0
Q1-2009	9	9	0
Q2-2009	14	14	0
Q3-2009	18	17	+1
Q4-2009	16	15	+1
Q1-2010	12	12	0
Q2-2010	10	10	0
Q3-2010	11	11	0
Q4-2010	10	9	+1
Q1-2011	15	15	0
Q2-2011	20	20	0
Q3-2011	16	16	0
Q4-2011	7	7	0
Q1-2012	12	12	0
Q2-2012	5	5	0
Q3-2012	19	19	0
Q4-2012	14	14	0
Q1-2013	11	11	0
Q2-2013	13	13	0
Q3-2013	13	13	0
Q4-2013	5	5	0
Q1-2014	10	10	0
Q2-2014	9	9	0
Q3-2014	13	13	0
Total	344	340	+4

Source: OIG analysis of IPRA's quarterly reports and CPD use of force data

	Non-Hit Shootings		
	IPRA Reported	Actual Incidents	Discrepancy
Sept. 2007	3	4	-1
Q4-2007	1	5	-4
Q1-2008	12	12	0
Q2-2008	8	9	-1
Q3-2008	10	10	0
Q4-2008	7	12	-5
Q1-2009	9	12	-3
Q2-2009	13	16	-3
Q3-2009	16	22	-6
Q4-2009	19	20	-1
Q1-2010	14	12	+2
Q2-2010	10	12	-2
Q3-2010	10	11	-1
Q4-2010	10	10	0
Q1-2011	12	15	-3
Q2-2011	10	11	-1
Q3-2011	17	19	-2
Q4-2011	14	16	-2
Q1-2012	10	13	-3
Q2-2012	12	12	0
Q3-2012	14	15	-1
Q4-2012	13	14	-1
Q1-2013	9	12	-3
Q2-2013	7	8	-1
Q3-2013	5	6	-1
Q4-2013	4	5	-1
Q1-2014	4	7	-3
Q2-2014	9	9	0
Q3-2014	9	11	-2
Total	291	340	-49

Source: OIG analysis of IPRA's quarterly reports and CPD use of force data.

	Shooting/Animal		
	IPRA Reported	Actual Incidents	Discrepancy
Q4-2013	9	9	0
Q1-2014	14	14	0
Q2-2014	23	25	-2
Q3-2014	17	16	1
Total	63	64	-1

Source: OIG analysis of IPRA's quarterly reports and CPD use of force data.

	Taser		
	IPRA Reported	Actual Incidents	Discrepancy
Q4-2013	77	85	-8
Q1-2014	76	87	-11
Q2-2014	111	121	-10
Q3-2014	115	118	-3
Total	379	411	-32

Source: OIG analysis of IPRA's quarterly reports and CPD use of force data.

	OC Discharges		
	IPRA Reported	Actual Incidents	Discrepancy
Q4-2013	2	22	-20
Q1-2014	2	25	-23
Q2-2014	1	42	-41
Q3-2014	2	37	-35
Total	7	126	-119

Source: OIG analysis of IPRA's quarterly reports and CPD use of force data.

CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

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To Suggest Ways to Improve City Government	Visit our website: https://chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/get-involved/help-improve-city-government/
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in City Programs	Call OIG's toll-free hotline 866-IG-TIPLINE (866-448-4754). Talk to an investigator from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday-Friday. Or visit our website: http://chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/get-involved/fight-waste-fraud-and-abuse/

MISSION

The City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) is an independent, nonpartisan oversight agency whose mission is to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the administration of programs and operations of City government. OIG achieves this mission through,

- administrative and criminal investigations;
- audits of City programs and operations; and
- reviews of City programs, operations, and policies.

From these activities, OIG issues reports of findings and disciplinary and other recommendations to assure that City officials, employees, and vendors are held accountable for the provision of efficient, cost-effective government operations and further to prevent, detect, identify, expose and eliminate waste, inefficiency, misconduct, fraud, corruption, and abuse of public authority and resources.

AUTHORITY

The authority to produce reports and recommendations on ways to improve City operations is established in the City of Chicago Municipal Code § 2-56-030(c), which confers upon the Inspector General the following power and duty:

To promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness and integrity in the administration of the programs and operations of the city government by reviewing programs, identifying any inefficiencies, waste and potential for misconduct therein, and recommending to the mayor and the city council policies and methods for the elimination of inefficiencies and waste, and the prevention of misconduct.