REPORT ON RACE- AND ETHNICITY-BASED DISPARITIES IN THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S USE OF FORCE

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# ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BWC</td>
<td>Body Worn Camera</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPA</td>
<td>Civilian Office of Police Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Chicago Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRD</td>
<td>Force Review Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Investigatory Stop Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPSSS</td>
<td>Traffic and Pedestrian Stop Statistical Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRR</td>
<td>Tactical Response Report</td>
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OIG found that Black people were much more likely to be stopped in investigatory and traffic stops than non-Black people, and these types of stops led to 34% of all use-of-force incidents.

Once stopped, Black people were also more likely to face a use of force.

Among all people who experienced a use of force, Black people were more likely to be subjected to a more severe use of force.

These patterns of race-based disparities persist after taking into account CPD-defined District crime levels and subject actions in the encounter.

OIG found no evidence of race- or ethnicity-based disparities in officer reporting of force mitigation efforts, such as giving verbal direction, strategic positioning, or the use of "time as a tactic" to defuse use-of-force encounters.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Public Safety section of the City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an evaluation of race- and ethnicity-based disparities in the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD) use of force. With a few exceptions delineated in policy, CPD members are required to document all takedowns, manual strikes, uses of less-lethal weapons, and uses of lethal force on a Tactical Response Report (TRR). The TRR collects a wide range of officer-reported information about use-of-force incidents, including: demographic information about the officer and the subject; the time and location of the incident; the “type of activity” that led to the incident, such as an investigatory stop, traffic stop, mental health related incident, or pursuit or arrest of a subject; information about the subject’s actions; and information about efforts the CPD member took to limit the need for use of force (“force mitigation efforts”), such as giving verbal direction, strategic positioning, and the use of “time as a tactic.”

OIG analyzed CPD’s TRR data and other, complementary CPD-generated data from October 17, 2017, through February 28, 2020. The objective of this evaluation was to assess whether there was any evidence of race- or ethnicity-based disparities in use-of-force encounters in this period. OIG construed this objective broadly and used the available data to evaluate evidence of disparities across several phases of use-of-force encounters: (1) disparity in the likelihood of being stopped; (2) disparity in the likelihood of facing a use of force after having been stopped; (3) disparity in the level of force deployed in use-of-force encounters; (4) disparity in the number of uses of force deployed in use-of-force encounters; and (5) disparity in the number of force mitigation efforts deployed in use-of-force encounters. The findings below report on each of these analyses separately, and the background to the report provides an overview of the data limitations associated with each analysis.

The TRR data that OIG analyzed in this report can be accessed publicly through OIG’s Information Portal. Using the data in the Tactical Response Reports dashboard, readers can replicate analyses presented here, drawing on continuously refreshed data and filtering with variables of interest. Readers can also use the data to explore patterns in CPD use of force while making use of reported data not analyzed in this report, including subject sex, subject age, and whether the CPD member reported the subject to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

OIG found evidence of disparities in some but not all of its separate analyses. Where disparities were identified, they consistently disadvantaged Black people and consistently advantaged White people. The results were mixed for Hispanic people, and the other racial/ethnic groups represented in CPD’s TRR data—Asian/Pacific Islanders and Native Americans/Alaskan Natives—appear in the data in numbers too small to support strong conclusions about disparities in use of force.

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The disparities disadvantaging Black people were most pronounced and supported by the strongest evidence with respect to the earliest phases of a use of force interaction: who gets stopped by the police and who gets subjected to a use of force of any type. OIG found that Black people were far more likely to be stopped by the police than non-Black people in investigatory stops and traffic stops. This result was consistent across CPD Districts, and the disparity cannot be explained entirely by different patterns of officer behavior in the Districts that CPD defines as “high crime” Districts (i.e., CPD’s “Tier 1” Districts). Separately, OIG found that, once stopped in an investigatory stop or traffic stop, Black people were more likely than non-Black people to face use of force. This result was also consistent across CPD Districts.

OIG separately analyzed TRR data for evidence of race- or ethnicity-based disparities in the level of force CPD members apply to a subject in use-of-force encounters. Again, OIG found evidence of disparities disadvantaging Black people. OIG used TRR reporting of subject action and officer force level used to compare the levels of force deployed against people of different racial and ethnic groups who engaged in similar actions. This analysis showed that, while CPD was more likely to use lower levels of force against all people, Black people generally had higher odds of facing higher-level force options than non-Black people across levels of subject resistance. Among subjects who were reported to have used deadly force, Hispanic people were more likely to face a higher-level force option than non-Hispanic people. Meanwhile, White people were almost never more likely to face a higher-level use of force than non-White people.

OIG found no evidence of race- or ethnicity-based disparities in force mitigation efforts as reported by officers, nor did OIG find evidence of race- or ethnicity-based disparities in the frequency of application of multiple uses of force against individual subjects in a single incident.

The findings of this report are driven by quantitative data analysis. OIG recognizes that quantitative data analysis cannot capture the complexity or situational uniqueness of individual use-of-force incidents. Two reporting decisions flow from that recognition. First, Appendix C includes case studies that provide concrete details of selected use-of-force incidents, including sequencing of events. These case studies are sourced from OIG reviews of TRR narratives and body worn camera footage from selected incidents falling within the period of analysis. Second, OIG does not provide recommendations to CPD in this report. The quantitative analysis that forms the basis of the findings can provide important insights about where in the universe of police-civilian interactions CPD might focus its efforts to reduce disparate outcomes in its application of force; however, this data, taken on its own, cannot answer the question of why the disparities exist where they do. Establishing a rigorous understanding of cause would require different types of testing, for which this report can serve as a foundation. The report Conclusion identifies directions for further inquiry into core areas of police strategy and practice that merit further consideration as CPD, OIG, and the broader public seek a better understanding of the troubling patterns of racial disparities documented here.

OIG invited CPD’s response to the report, which is published in full in Appendix D. CPD’s response described use-of-force-related trainings offered before, during, and after the period of
analysis, as well as trainings planned for the future. Specifically, CPD’s letter of response stated, “since [OIG’s period of analysis], the Department has made great strides in Use of Force and Procedural Justice training and has revised numerous policies including, but not limited to, the entire Use of Force suite of orders. In fact, the Department has achieved preliminary compliance on the use of force paragraphs in the Consent Decree.” CPD also described its creation of the Force Review Division, “which reviews individual reports of force and makes recommendations for training opportunities, refers incidents for accountability review if necessary and reports out” on its work and findings.

In responding to the substance of the report, CPD posed several critical points. First, CPD stated that the report “represents a quantitative analysis of data and does not reflect the factual complexities and situational uniqueness of each use of force incident.” Second, CPD stated that OIG’s “Report as written suggests that any population’s disproportionate representation in a broad, quantitative review of stops, searches, and/or seizures, standing alone, was the result of improper or bias-based policing practices.” OIG disagrees with this reading of its report. As described above, this report does not reach the question of the causes of the disparities observed. Third, CPD asserted that OIG’s report “looks solely at population data rather than suspect data, crime data, etc.” While CPD’s reply letter does not name any specific data sources or analyses that CPD believes OIG neglected, it is not correct to state that OIG’s report only contextualizes use-of-force disparities with population data. In looking at disparities in stops by District, OIG relied on CPD’s own “Tiers” system, which ranks police Districts into groups based on their level of “public violence.” When looking at disparities in the level of severity of force applied in use-of-force incidents, OIG controlled for the level of resistance exhibited by the subject, as reported by the officer. Fourth, CPD stated that “the case studies presented in Appendix C do not address arrest charges or whether offenders possessed weapons.” OIG did review available arrest records related to the case studies in Appendix C. In each case study, OIG identified arrest charges for unlawful use of a weapon that were brought against any of the subjects of the incident. In each case study, OIG also reported on any weapons recoveries by officers that were documented on a TRR or clearly visible in body-worn camera footage. Fifth and finally, CPD alleges that OIG “incorrectly presumes that all ISRs resulted from self-initiated, ‘on-view’ Terry stops” instead of a myriad other ways in which officers may have received information giving rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause. OIG’s report makes no such presumption, however. The report simply notes that not all police encounters will be documented in ISRs and refers readers to CPD’s own policies to describe the circumstances under which an ISR must be completed.

OIG hopes this report will stand as an authoritative factual foundation for continued efforts to understand the root causes of disparities in CPD’s use of force and to minimize harms stemming from CPD’s use of force.
II. BACKGROUND

The City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated quantitative data on uses of force by the Chicago Police Department (CPD) for evidence of race- or ethnicity-based disparities. There are numerous recent evaluations and academic studies of police uses of force, including studies that analyze CPD data and studies that assess the specific question of race- or ethnicity-based disparities. OIG’s work is distinguished from other contributions on CPD’s use-of-force disparities in two key respects. First, OIG’s analysis is driven by distinctive institutional access to multiple, complementary sources of CPD data. This analysis draws on aggregated CPD data on street stops and traffic stops as well as CPD use-of-force reports.

Second, OIG adopts a granular, detail-oriented treatment of different types of police use-of-force incidents. Specifically, OIG presents quantitative results on use-of-force disparities that preserve a detailed differentiation of both the level of force used by CPD members and actions taken by individuals who are the subjects of the use of force, whenever that data was collected in the first instance. OIG takes this detail-oriented approach in an effort to appropriately acknowledge the operational reality faced by police officers in use-of-force situations; CPD members are standardly equipped with multiple weapons and trained on multiple manual force techniques, and distinct policies govern the deployment of those different force options. Likewise, the details of subject actions matter a great deal under the policies and laws governing CPD members’ uses of force. A person who stiffens their body during an arrest, versus one who attempts to flee, versus one who threatens a police officer with or without a weapon, may have all exhibited “resistance,” but their levels of resistance might constitute different legal offenses and might present different threat levels to the officer(s) or to other people involved. Accordingly, these different levels of resistance authorize different levels of CPD member response.

OIG’s analysis begins by examining racial and ethnic disparities in police stops (see Findings 1 and 2 below), in order to take a broad perspective on where such disparities may manifest in use-of-force encounters by assessing disparities across multiple phases of police-civilian encounters. This decision reflects the fact that analyzing only incidents in which a use of force did occur may understate the extent of disparities that actually exist, because racial or ethnic disparities may manifest in earlier phases of police-civilian interactions that sometimes, but not always, lead to


uses of force. If some racial or ethnic groups are stopped or detained by police at higher rates, this may lead to disparities in police use of force against them, even if this disparity is not detectable in the data on force used once those stops have occurred. In recognition of this methodological challenge, OIG reports on race- and ethnicity-based disparities in uses of force across multiple phases of police-civilian interactions, beginning with the initial stop.

Every police use of force against a member of the public begins with an encounter between the police and that subject. The causes may be varied, including the following scenarios: an officer may be approached by a person to initiate an encounter; an officer may stop a person on the basis of “reasonable articulable suspicion”; an officer may seek to arrest a person on the basis of probable cause; or an officer may encounter a person upon having been called or dispatched to an incident or scene in some other way. There is also limitless variability in how use-of-force incidents might unfold once a police-subject encounter has begun.

A use of force may take place within moments of an officer appearing on a scene with a person or after a prolonged interaction. In the simplest case, an incident may involve one officer deploying a single use of force (e.g., a single manual strike or a single discharge of a weapon) against one subject. More complex incidents may involve multiple officers, multiple subjects, or officers’ deployments of multiple uses of force. Officer(s) involved may attempt to “mitigate” or “de-escalate” situations before the first use of force, and they may do so after the first use of force or multiple uses of force. Meanwhile, the subject may take actions that would classify them, according to CPD policy, as a “cooperative subject,” a “passive resister,” an “active resister,” or an “assailant.” Over the course of a police encounter, a subject may move up or down this scale. An assailant can become a cooperative subject during an encounter with the police, and vice versa, and CPD’s use-of-force policies require that members change their tactics

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5 “Reasonable articulable suspicion” is the legal standard that allows an officer to temporarily detain a subject when the officer suspects “that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). CPD’s policy on investigatory stops defines it as follows: “Reasonable Articulable Suspicion is an objective legal standard that is less than probable cause but more substantial than a hunch or general suspicion. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances which the sworn member observes and the reasonable inferences that are drawn based on the sworn member’s training and experience. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion can result from a combination of particular facts, which may appear innocuous in and of themselves, but taken together amount to reasonable suspicion.” “Special Order S04-13-09 Investigatory Stop System,” July 10, 2017, accessed July 20, 2021, https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6568.

6 Throughout this report, OIG sometimes refers to those who experience a use of force by the police as “subjects,” sometimes simply as “people.” The choice between these terms in any specific context is driven by considerations of grammatical clarity and readability. In some contexts, “subject” is a clearer referent than “person,” because multiple people may be present on the scene of a use-of-force encounter. OIG’s use of the term “subject” in a use-of-force encounter in this report does not imply any conclusions about the lawfulness of the subject’s behavior.

7 CPD’s definitions of these terms for people exhibiting different levels of resistance are given in “General Order G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options,” April 15, 2021, accessed December 10, 2021, https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6605.
In short, every use-of-force incident has unique situational factors, and these unique, case-specific factors complicate any effort to assess whether there is a pattern of racial/ethnic disparities in outcomes across a group of cases that are similar in some respects and different in others. A fundamental methodological challenge in assessing this data is therefore to define comparison groups of cases that are large enough to allow for identification of patterns in the data, while ensuring that cases within each comparison group are mutually similar enough that a comparison of outcomes is valid.

A final outcome of disparity in use of force could arise in one of several ways: (1) disparity in whom the police stop; (2) disparity in police efforts to mitigate the force required or to de-escalate situations; (3) disparity in the severity of the force option(s) the police deploy; and (4) disparity in the number of distinct uses of force the police deploy. There are limits to the data available to assess disparities at each one of these phases, and these limits are described in detail below; data limitations preclude some types of analysis that would be relevant to the topic of this report. But the analyses that can be conducted with the available data support the conclusion that there is a consistent disadvantage for Black people in police use-of-force interactions, beginning with an overwhelmingly disproportionate number of police stops of Black people and compounding through subsequent police actions in use-of-force incidents.

OIG’s period of analysis includes use-of-force reports filed between October 17, 2017, and February 28, 2020. These dates correspond to two revisions of CPD’s use-of-force policies; during the period between these two dates, CPD’s use-of-force policies did not change. The end of this period of analysis also lines up with the beginning of disruptions wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic. As documented in the OIG Public Safety section’s 2020 Annual Report, there were significant changes in the volume of CPD’s investigatory stops, arrests, and uses of force beginning in March 2020.

A. KEY TERMS

There are several terms that are key to OIG’s analysis and that require clear definition at the outset: “race” and “ethnicity,” “disparity” as distinct from “bias,” and “force mitigation” in

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9 As the public-facing Use of Force Dashboard that accompanies this report shows, the earliest incident date in OIG’s dataset is October 16, 2017. This is explained by the fact that a small number of TRRs (7) were filled out on October 17, 2017, using the updated TRR that went into effect on that date, but describe incidents that occurred on October 16, 2017. Because some TRRs in the new format reflected incidents that occurred October 16, 2017, that date is the start date for the Investigatory Stop Report and traffic stop data analyzed in this report.

10 CPD use of force and use-of-force reporting obligations are covered by a set of several general orders numbered G03-02 and G03-02-01 through G03-02-08. As of February 2022, the most recent revision to these general orders was effective April 15, 2021. See “General Order G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options,” April 15, 2021, accessed September 15, 2021, https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6605.

relation to “de-escalation.” For clarity, OIG explains its usage of each of these terms in the paragraphs below.

**RACE AND ETHNICITY**

This report evaluates disparities in use of force on the basis of “race” and “ethnicity.” OIG follows the U.S. Census Bureau—the source for the Chicago population data used in this report—in recognizing that the terms “race” and “ethnicity” denote different concepts. In its decennial census, the Census Bureau invites respondents to self-identify their race and, separately, to indicate whether they self-identify as ethnically Hispanic. This report assesses disparities using demographic data on both race and Hispanic ethnicity; it is, therefore, a report on both race- and ethnicity-based disparities in use of force.

The analysis OIG conducted has been constrained by the race and ethnicity classifications CPD uses, the data collection procedures that generated the raw demographic data, and the volume of data available for analysis. These limitations are described in more detail at the end of the Background section and in the Methodology section.

**DISPARITY AND BIAS**

For the purposes of this report, the term “disparity” or “racial or ethnic disparity” refers to a pattern of difference in outcomes for individuals that correlates with those individuals’ race or ethnicity. In this report, OIG assesses whether there are racial/ethnic disparities in several phases of use-of-force interactions, including rates at which people are stopped by the police, rates at which people are subjected to a use of force, and the severity of the force people face when they are subjected to a use of force. Clear patterns of difference in outcomes may be, but are not necessarily, suggestive of a causal relationship. The likelihood that a subject’s race or ethnicity is, in fact, a cause of observed disparity increases if a disparity is still observable when other potential causal factors are taken into account in the analysis, such as the geographic location of the encounter and the subject’s actions prior to being stopped or prior to facing a use of force.

Bias is one possible cause of observed race- or ethnicity-based disparities in stops, uses of force, or the other outcomes assessed in this report. CPD’s directives expressly prohibit “racial profiling and other bias based policing,” and, by way of explanation for this prohibition, state that “in making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions, such as investigatory stops, traffic stops and arrests, Chicago Police Department officers may not use race, ethnicity, color, national origin, ancestry, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge status, financial status, or lawful source of income to any degree, except that officers may rely on the listed characteristics in a specific suspect

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CPD’s policy statement prohibits “bias” as a matter of conscious discrimination by individual officers. Social scientists also regularly use the term “bias” to mean phenomena quite different from conscious discrimination by individuals: “implicit bias” and “structural bias” or “structural racism” are topics of active research in psychology, sociology, and related fields. In this report, OIG does not attempt to disentangle the meaning of different types of “bias,” much less the question of whether bias of one type or another is a cause of the disparities observed in different phases of use-of-force interactions. The data reported below are descriptive, and while the evidence presented amounts to a clear empirical demonstration of race-based disparity, OIG’s analysis does not reach the issue of the cause or causes of this disparity.

FORCE MITIGATION AND DE-ESCALATION

The related concepts of “force mitigation” and “de-escalation” are central to CPD’s policies and training on use of force. In April 2021 (after the period of analysis for this evaluation), CPD renamed its “Use of Force” policy (G03-02) to “De-escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force.” The term “de-escalation” is widely used in the policing profession; “force mitigation” appears to be more distinctive to CPD in its usage in policy and force reporting forms. CPD’s directives state three “principles of force mitigation”: “continual communication,” “tactical positioning,” and “time as a tactic.” The directive further explains the tactical value of continual communication, advantageous positioning, and slowing down the pace of the incident. These principles of force mitigation overlap with the CPD definition of “de-escalation” in the directives; for example in the statement, “examples of de-escalation techniques include but are not limited to ‘communication, advantageous positioning, and slowing down the pace of the incident.’”

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14 “Implicit bias” refers to associations or biases that people hold unconsciously. If a person holds an implicit bias, they would not state the bias as their attitude or belief when asked, but researchers in this area argue that implicit biases can be identified and measured through psychological experiments. “Implicit Bias,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 31, 2019, accessed August 18, 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicit-bias/; Mahzarin Banaji and Anthony Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People (New York: Bantam, 2013). “Structural bias” refers to social structural conditions—including laws, government policies, or social norms—that create disparate outcomes for different demographic groups even if they are neutral on their face. One example of structural bias in the legal system is the gap in federal sentencing penalties for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine offenses, which were reduced but not eliminated by the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2010), p. 174.
16 In its research, OIG requested and received use-of-force reporting forms from numerous peer agencies. Several of these agencies use the term “de-escalation” in their written use-of-force policies and/or force reporting forms, including Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Houston, New York, and Seattle. “Force mitigation,” by contrast, does not appear in these agencies’ policies or force reporting forms, nor does it appear in the policies or reporting forms of other jurisdictions OIG reviewed.
17 “General Order G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options,” III., April 15, 2021, accessed August 18, 2021, https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6605. While G03-02-01 has been updated since the period of analysis for this report, the version of the policy in effect during the period of analysis also stated these principles.
to...determining whether the member may be able to stabilize the situation through the use of
time, distance, or positioning to isolate and contain a subject.”

Both terms—“force mitigation” and “de-escalation”—are predicated on the principle that force
options exist on a spectrum and that officers should seek to use the minimum level of force
necessary to gain control of a situation and the people on the scene. CPD’s policies are clear that
force mitigation and de-escalation efforts are of value if they reduce the probability of the need
for a use of force or reduce the severity of force that is needed, even if they cannot altogether
eliminate the need for any use of force. In other words, under CPD’s use-of-force policies,
fewer uses of force are preferable to more, when fewer uses of force are sufficient for CPD
members to gain effective control; and less severe uses of force are preferable to more severe
force options, when the less severe options are similarly sufficient. Accordingly, this report
analyzes data for whether there is evidence of race- and ethnicity-based disparities in the
number of force uses police deploy, the level of severity of force that they deploy, and the
number of force mitigation efforts they rely upon before or during use-of-force encounters.

B. POLICE STOPS

The risk of being subjected to a use of force by the police begins with a police-civilian encounter.
If people who belong to a given demographic group are more likely to be stopped by the police
than another group, then their exposure to a disproportionate number of police encounters
should factor into an assessment of whether there are racial disparities in the use of force.

AVAILABLE DATA

An Illinois State statute, the Traffic and Pedestrian Stop Statistical Study (TPSSS), requires all
state and local law enforcement agencies to create a record of every traffic stop and pedestrian
stop (or “investigatory stop” per CPD), requiring the record to include geographic location and
demographic information on the person stopped. CPD uses two distinct reporting forms to do

18 “General Order G03-02 De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force,” III.C.2.b., April 15, 2021,
accessed August 18, 2021, https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6214. This statement also appears
in the version of directive G03-02 that was in effect during the period of analysis for this report. A recent scholarly
analysis of police use of force further elaborates on the value of “time as a tactic”: “expanding the amount of time
that officers have to assess a situation and react appropriately is one tactic that can reduce the need to use force,
but officers can also use that time to employ additional tactics to mitigate risks and avoid threats.” Seth Stoughton,
175.

19 “Department members will modify the use of force as circumstances change and in ways that are consistent with
officer safety, including stopping the use of force when it is no longer necessary.” “General Order G03-02 De-

20 “Department members will use the minimum amount of force needed to provide for the safety of any person or
Department member, stop an attack, make an arrest, bring a person or situation safely under control, or prevent
escape. Department members will continually assess the necessity of the use of force and whether alternatives may
be employed, including the use of de-escalation techniques, other response options, and the availability of other
resources.” “General Order G03-02 De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force,” III.B.2., April 15, 2021,

21 625 ILCS 5/11-212.
this. One set of forms collects data from traffic stops: the Traffic Stop Statistical Study—Driver Information Card and the Traffic Stop Statistical Study Sticker (TSSSS form).\(^2^2\) A separate form collects data from pedestrian stops: the Investigatory Stop Report (ISR).\(^2^3\) OIG has analyzed both sets of records for evidence of racial and ethnic disparities.\(^2^4\)

**DATA LIMITATIONS**

Because of the TPSSS statute, the collection of subject demographic data on traffic stops and investigatory stops (through TSSSS and ISR forms) is more systematic than the collection of data on other contexts in which a police encounter may begin (see Figure 1 for a visual depiction of the relevant data collection differences). Specifically, CPD members are required by policy to report demographic characteristics of the person being stopped following traffic stops and investigatory stops. The existence of the full dataset of traffic and investigatory stops, including reported race or ethnicity of the individual stopped, sets these police encounters apart from other types of police encounters in terms of available data. So, for traffic and investigatory stops, it is possible to analyze compounding disparities at successive stages of the police encounter by comparing: (1) the representation of a given racial or ethnic group in the population; to (2) the representation of that group at the “stop” stage; to (3) their representation in the universe of reported police uses of force. For police encounters that begin outside of the traffic or investigatory stop context, there is no CPD policy or applicable law that requires officers to record data on subject race or ethnicity, so systematic data on the demographic profiles of people whose police encounters begin outside of traffic and investigatory stops is not available. This precludes the analysis of compounding disparities in other contexts in which police encounters begin.\(^2^5\)

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\(^2^4\) Under CPD policy, there should be no overlap between the stops reported through these two reporting systems. S04-14-09 states, “Department members will follow procedures consistent with the directive entitled “[Investigatory Stop System]” to fulfill the requirements for the pedestrian stop statistical section of [625 ILCS 5/11-212]” (emphasis in original). “Special Order S04-14-09 Illinois Traffic and Pedestrian Stop Statistical Study,” I.A., March 23, 2018, accessed July 20, 2021, [https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6689](https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6689). CPD policy requires completion of an ISR under a broader set of circumstances than what is required to fulfill pedestrian stop reporting obligations under 625 ILCS 5/11-212.

\(^2^5\) CPD does regularly collect subject demographic information on arrest reports, and information on demographics of CPD arrestees can be explored on OIG’s dashboards: City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, “CPD Arrests,” accessed January 22, 2022, [https://informationportal.igchicago.org/cpd-arrests-overview-demographics/](https://informationportal.igchicago.org/cpd-arrests-overview-demographics/). OIG does not analyze demographic disparities in arrests in this report in part because the population of arrests overlaps the population of investigatory stops and traffic stops analyzed in Findings 1 and 2.
Despite the fact that an analysis of compounding disparity cannot be conducted for all police encounters, OIG opted to analyze police encounters that begin as traffic or investigatory stops, for two reasons. First, traffic and investigatory stops make up a significant share of police encounters that result in reported police use of force. In the period of analysis, a total of 1,533 use-of-force subject-incidents were reported as occurring during an investigatory stop or a traffic stop, as recorded in Tactical Response Reports (TRRs), CPD’s form for reporting use-of-force incidents. This accounts for 34% of the total number of use-of-force subject-incidents reported over that period (4,534). The remaining use-of-force incidents reported in this period were marked as occurring in some context other than an investigatory stop or a traffic stop. The most frequent contexts reported were: “Pursuing/Arresting Subject” (1,418 subject-incidents in the period of analysis), “Disturbance – Other” (837 subject-incidents), or “Disturbance – Domestic” (742 subject-incidents). Figure 2 shows how frequently officers reported each context on the TRR. Second, only looking at the eventual police use of force (that is, only analyzing the TRRs themselves) would only tell part of the story, answering the question “which racial or ethnic groups experience the most police uses of force,” but not the question, “to what extent do stops expose members of a given racial or ethnic group to the possible use of force?”

26 “CPD-11.377 Tactical Response Report,” December 2020, accessed July 20, 2021, http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.377.pdf. The count of subject-incidents given above is not identical to a count of TRRs. An incident with multiple subjects would count multiple times towards this total. For example, if Officer A encounters Person A and Person B together on the street and deploys a reportable use of force against them both, that would count as two “subject-incidents” in OIG’s analysis: Officer A-Person A and Officer A-Person B.
In Figure 2, the reported types of context are not mutually exclusive; reporting CPD members can select more than one on the TRR if applicable. In the period of analysis, 147 incidents were reported on TRRs as occurring in the context of both a traffic and investigatory stop.

Findings 1 and 2 of this report focuses on traffic and investigatory stops and the subset of TRRs (34%) that result from those stops, speaking to the compounding disparity from the initiation of a police encounter to the end of that encounter in a reported use of force. Findings 3–5 are based on an analysis of the full universe (100%) of TRRs, but do not speak to compounding disparity. These analytical choices follow from the limitations of data collected regarding non-stop police encounters.

C. SELECTION OF FORCE OPTION AND USE OF FORCE

CPD’s use-of-force policy outlines both “control tactics” and “force options.” Although some control tactics are intended to “amplify nonimpact pressure” via joint manipulation and pressure point techniques in order to gain compliance, use of control tactics alone does not, by policy, necessitate the completion of a TRR. For the purposes of this analysis, OIG defines “use of force” to include any technique that, by itself, must be reported on a TRR: takedowns, open hand manual strikes, “focused pressure” manual strikes such as punching or kicking, the use of less-lethal weapons (including OC spray, Tasers, and batons used as impact weapons), and the use of lethal weapons.²⁷ Any of these actions, regardless of any other factors in an encounter,

²⁷ Other factors that can trigger the completion of a TRR are: a subject injury or allegation of injury, or a battery to the officer. Different reporting obligations may also be followed in mass arrest settings and protest response settings. “General Order G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report,” III.A., April 15, 2021, accessed July 20, 2021, https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6610; City of Chicago Office
necessitate the completion of a TRR. Pointing a firearm without discharging it is a special case covered by Department Notice D19-01; pointing of a firearm does not require the completion of a TRR.\textsuperscript{28}

CPD’s use-of-force policies leave some ambiguity as to how officers should report pushing or shoving, whether manually or with a baton. These actions are not characterized as control tactics in the relevant policies, nor do they clearly fit under any of CPD’s outlined “force options.”\textsuperscript{29}

OIG’s analysis relies on TRRs as the primary source data for identifying CPD uses of force. Therefore, incidents are in scope as use-of-force incidents if they include at least one use of force at the level of a takedown or above. Firearm pointing, because it is not reported to the same level of detail that is provided on TRRs, is excluded from the analysis.

**AVAILABLE DATA**

CPD’s TRR collects extensive information about use-of-force incidents, including but not limited to: subject actions; officer actions (force mitigation, control tactics, and force options deployed); subject descriptive information (race/ethnicity, sex, height, weight, whether apparently under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and whether injured or alleged injury); the location of the incident; and the time of day and weather conditions. For most types of incidents, officers are also required to complete a narrative of the incident.\textsuperscript{30}

For the purposes of OIG’s analysis, “subject action” is defined along an ordinal 8-point scale, according to the reportable options on the TRR:

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\textsuperscript{29} In December 2020, CPD revised its TRR to include an additional checkbox under the section, “Member’s Response—Response Without Weapons” that reads, “Push/Physical Redirection.” This change on the TRR was not accompanied by changes to policy that clearly delineated members’ obligations to report pushes as uses of force. In an interview, CPD Force Review Division personnel did not articulate a clear rule governing the reportability of pushes with or without batons. They did, however, describe two examples. First, they stated that in a situation where somebody tries to come onto the crime scene and officers have to push or redirect individuals using their batons, a TRR would not be required, because officers are simply telling an individual they cannot enter the scene. Second, Force Review Division personnel stated that if a subject falls down as the result of a redirect push, it would be “in the officer’s best interest to fill out a TRR,” regardless of whether there was an allegation of injury or not.

\textsuperscript{30} The TRR instructs members to “describe with specificity, (1) the use-of-force incident, (2) the subject’s actions, and (3) the Department member’s response, including force mitigation efforts and specific types and amount of force used.” The instructions also state that “the involved member will not complete the narrative section for any firearm discharge incidents (with or without injury) or in any use-of-force incidents resulting in death” (emphasis in original). “CPD-11.377 Tactical Response Report,” December 2020, accessed July 20, 2021, http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.377.pdf.
• Did not comply
• Stiffened
• Pulled away
• Fled
• Threatened battery without weapon
• Attacked without weapon
• Used weapon
• Used deadly force

Officers’ selection of force options is defined along an ordinal 4-point scale, according to the reportable options on the TRR:

• Takedown
• Manual striking force
• Less-lethal weapon force
• Lethal force

Figure 3 shows the “Subject’s Action” and “Member’s Response” fields on CPD’s TRR that was operative during the period of analysis, where the above-listed options are presented as checkboxes.

31 This category in OIG’s analysis covers the TRR checkboxes for both “Unable to understand verbal command” and “Did not follow verbal command.”
32 This category in OIG’s analysis covers the TRR checkboxes for “Attempt to obtain member’s weapon,” “Imminent threat of battery with weapon,” and “Physical attack with weapon.”
33 Officers completing TRRs now typically do so through an electronic interface. However, CPD continues to publish an electronic PDF version of the form in its online listing of directives. The TRR was revised in December 2020, and two additions were made to the checkboxes available for CPD members to report subject actions and officer actions. The December 2020 revision added “Physical Obstruction” to the checkboxes available for officers to indicate subject actions and added “Push/Physical Redirection” to the checkboxes available for officers to indicate their own “Response Without Weapons.” Figure 2 shows an image of the relevant sections of the TRR as it appeared during the period of analysis, when it did not include those two checkboxes.
When TRRs related to an incident indicate that either the subject or the CPD member took more than one action, OIG coded the incident at the “highest level” actions taken by the subject and by the officer for the purposes of analysis. For example, if TRRs from a single incident indicated that a subject pulled away and also attacked without a weapon, then in OIG’s quantitative analysis, this incident would be compared with other incidents that included subjects attacking without weapons. Similarly, if TRRs from a single incident indicated that a responding CPD member or members conducted a takedown and also used manual striking force, then in OIG’s quantitative analysis, this incident would be compared with other incidents that included members’ use of manual striking force.

The level of detail captured in TRRs allows for focused comparisons of groups of incidents, and the OIG Levels of Force dashboard that accompanies the publication of this report makes those additional levels of detail in use of force reports publicly accessible. The dashboard allows viewers to compare uses of force across demographic groups while controlling for any or all of the following variables:

- Officer action (level of force used)
- Subject action
- Subject Male/Female designation
- CPD-defined District crime level (“Tier”)

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- Activity type (e.g., investigatory stop, traffic stop, etc.)
- Subject age
- Subject alcohol/drug use
- Subject weapon possession

OIG’s quantitative assessment of whether there is evidence of racial/ethnic disparities in the severity of force applied during use-of-force incidents is reported in Finding 3. In order to create a quantitative assessment of evidence for disparities across the entire range of both subject actions and officer actions, OIG used odds ratio calculations. These odds ratio calculations pose the question, “in situations where subjects exhibit equivalent levels of resistance and officers deploy a reportable use of force, what are the odds that subjects of [racial/ethnic group y] are subjected to a use of force at or above [force level z], relative to the odds that [non-y] subjects are subjected to a use of force at or above [force level z]?” Specifically, OIG calculated odds ratios of the following form:

\[
\text{odds ratio} = \frac{UOF_{(z+)\text{(y)}} + UOF_{(z-)\text{(y)}}}{UOF_{(z+)\text{(non-y)}} + UOF_{(z-)\text{(non-y)}}}
\]

where:

- \(UOF_{(z+)\text{(y)}}\) = number of uses of force at or above force level \(z\) against group \(y\) subjects
- \(UOF_{(z-)\text{(y)}}\) = number of uses of force below force level \(z\) against group \(y\) subjects
- \(UOF_{(z+)\text{(non-y)}}\) = number of uses of force at or above force level \(z\) against (non-\(y\)) subjects
- \(UOF_{(z-)\text{(non-y)}}\) = number of uses of force below force level \(z\) against (non-\(y\)) subjects

Calculation of odds ratios is a standard analytic methodology used to compare outcome rates between groups. Odds ratios equal to 1 indicate no pattern of disparity on the basis of race/ethnicity in officer use of force at or above [force level z], versus use of force below [force level z]. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that subjects of [racial/ethnic group y] were more likely to be subject to a use of force at or above [force level z] than the comparison population group. For example, an odds ratio of 1.5 would mean that subjects of [racial/ethnic group y] were subjected to a use of force at or above [force level z] at a 50% higher rate than the comparison group. In other words, members of [racial/ethnic group y] would have 1.5 times the odds of that outcome relative to the comparison group.

OIG ran these tests with comparison racial/ethnic groups of [group]/[non-group] (e.g., Black subjects vs. non-Black subjects) and with comparison groups of [group a]/[group b] (e.g., Black subjects vs. White subjects). Appendix B shows additional results of similar analyses after introducing controls for CPD-defined District crime level (“Tier”), showing that the disparities reported in Finding 3 are consistent across different subsets of the data.

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35 An odds ratio is defined as the ratio of the odds of an occurrence of an outcome \(A\) in the presence of a condition \(B\) to the odds of an occurrence of an outcome \(A\) in the absence of condition \(B\). When odds ratios are equal to 1, the odds of outcome \(A\) are independent of the presence or absence of condition \(B\).

36 CPD’s District “Tiers” are intended to reflect relative crime levels by District. CPD’s Tiers are groups of Districts defined by CPD on the basis of their level of “public violence,” with Tier 1 designating the Districts with the most...
The odds ratios reported in Finding 3 and Appendix B are reported along with p-values; however, OIG did not set thresholds for statistical significance when running these analyses. OIG reports these p-values, without having set significant thresholds, because p-values are the standard measure used to evaluate odds ratios and are the only single measure that incorporates all of the underlying numbers in the calculation of an odds ratio to give an assessment of the strength of the calculation. The odds ratios reported in Finding 3 and Appendix B should be read holistically, with p-values, effect sizes (how much the odds ratios differ from 1), sample sizes (the number of cases involved in each comparison), and consistency across different subsets of the data all taken into consideration.

DATA LIMITATIONS

OIG’s odds ratio calculations in Finding 3 and Appendix B rely on a narrower but more focused base of empirical data than the testing reported in Findings 1 and 2. In the period of analysis, there over one million combined traffic stops and investigatory stops to analyze when assessing disparities in rates of stops, whereas there are only 4,534 use-of-force subject-incidents. When controlling for subject action and officer level of force, the set of cases for comparison reduces further. While these analyses of smaller numbers of cases are less likely to yield clear patterns (that is, the data is more likely to be “noisy”), the consistency of the results across multiple different subsets of the data provides a stronger foundation for confidence in the results than any single odds ratio calculation alone.

public violence and Tier 4 the Districts with the least public violence. CPD personnel reported to OIG that the Tiers were initially calculated during Garry McCarthy’s tenure as Superintendent (2011–2015) and that the original Tier designations were still in use by CPD during the period of analysis, with only two modifications: the 4th District, originally designated Tier 3, is now designated Tier 2; and the 24th District, originally designated Tier 2, is now designated Tier 3. CPD personnel also reported that the Tier system continues to be used in some reports generated by the CompStat group and has been a factor in CPD resource allocation decisions, including the prioritization of Districts to receive Strategic Decision Support Centers and the allocation of Community Safety Teams. When asked whether CPD relied on any formal system or metric other than the Tiers to measuring the level of crime in different areas of the City, a representative of the CompStat group did not name any such system or metric.

In statistical testing, p-values measure the probability that you would find a result (in this case, a race- or ethnicity-based disparity in outcomes) at least as extreme as the observed result if the null hypothesis were true (in this case, the hypothesis that there is no race- or ethnicity-based disparity in outcomes). P-values range from 0 to 1, and p-values closer to 0 allow for higher confidence that the null hypothesis is false. It is common in social science research to set a threshold for reporting statistical significance at p < 0.05 or p < 0.01. But when running many statistical tests of the same type, any single test that meets a given threshold for significance ought to carry less weight. For example, running one hundred statistical tests that ask a similar question, and getting one result at p < 0.01, should not give confidence that this one result is statistically meaningful. A complete assessment of significance in such a scenario would account for how interdependent the one hundred statistical tests were. In this evaluation, OIG calculated hundreds of odds ratios to calculate disparities in outcomes in use-of-force incidents.

The data OIG analyzed contains 337,090 ISRs and 1,278,653 traffic stop reports. OIG did not attempt to evaluate these two datasets for duplicate records, so it is not necessarily accurate to take the sum of these two numbers as representing the total number of police stops.
D. FORCE MITIGATION

CPD’s use-of-force policy instructs members that “during all use-of-force incidents, when it is safe and feasible to do so, Department members will use the principles of Force Mitigation to ensure effective police-public encounters.”\(^\text{39}\) The policy goes on to describe the concepts and tactical elements of force mitigation.

AVAILABLE DATA

As described above, for its analysis of subject demographics in police stops, OIG examined data on investigatory stops and traffic stops. In contrast, for its analysis of subject demographics in uses of force and force mitigation efforts, OIG examined data contained in all of the TRRs completed during the period of analysis, not just those that began with a traffic or investigatory stop. The database of uses of force—TRRS—is much smaller than the two available databases of stops, because there are far fewer use-of-force subject-incidents than there are stops.

On the TRR, CPD members are required to record force mitigation efforts they made before resorting to the use of force. The TRR includes the following checkboxes to indicate force mitigation efforts: “Member Presence”; “Zone of Safety”; “Movement to Avoid Attack”; “Tactical Positioning”; “Verbal Direction/Control Techniques”; “Specialized Units”; “Additional Unit Members”; “Other [write-in]”; and “None.”\(^\text{40}\) This means that, in every instance in which a use of force is reported, a CPD member-created record is (or should be) available for any force mitigation efforts that the member deployed, either before the first or after the first use of force.

DATA LIMITATIONS

Because of the limited data that is available on force mitigation efforts, OIG is not able to evaluate the question of whether there is racial disparity in the use of force mitigation efforts to de-escalate potential use-of-force situations. Notably, CPD members are not required to complete a TRR when they only engage in force mitigation and do not use force at all, or when they engage in force mitigation and the use of “control tactics” but do not use force at the level of a takedown or above. There is, therefore, no data available on the entire universe of force mitigation efforts; such efforts that successfully avoid the use of force may not be reported. OIG is therefore limited instead to asking the narrower question: Among incidents in which a use of force eventually did take place, is there evidence of racial disparity in officers’ deployment of force mitigation tactics?


E. GLOBAL DATA LIMITATIONS

The reliability of the findings reported below depends on the reliability of CPD’s reporting on investigatory stops, traffic stops, and uses of force. In this evaluation, OIG did not attempt to estimate the frequency of unreported or improperly reported stops or uses of force. Through other work, OIG has seen occasional examples of failures to properly report incidents on these reporting forms. Since January 2020, in the course of OIG’s review of closed disciplinary cases, OIG has encountered at least three incidents in which a completed misconduct investigation confirmed that a CPD member or members failed to properly document their use of force on a TRR.41

CPD was not able to provide OIG with any empirical estimate of rates of unreported or improperly reported stops or uses of force. CPD command staff responsible for the Force Review Division (FRD) reported that FRD exercises no oversight over whether TRRs are always completed when required.42 They further stated that FRD has not conducted any audit of compliance with use of force reporting obligations, and they did not know if any type of internal audit had been conducted by any other CPD unit.

In addition, in analyzing records of police stops and use-of-force incidents, OIG has been limited in its ability to analyze subject race and ethnicity by the terms that CPD uses for its data collection and the way in which that data is collected. When reporting uses of force, CPD members must identify a “race” category for the individual subjected to a use of force. “Race” appears as a free-form entry field on the fillable PDF version of the TRR that is available for download on CPD’s website. However, the TRR is also available to reporting officers through CPD’s internal electronic reporting system, and that version of the TRR has a drop-down menu for the data field “race.” There is an option for officers to select “Does Not Apply” if “the subject

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41 In one instance, body worn camera footage captured the accused officer kicking the subject in the face or head. The officer’s TRR documented his other responses, including member presence, verbal commands, and takedown/emergency handcuffing, but the officer failed to report the kick. In a second incident, the accused officer’s TRR notes the following responses: member presence, verbal direction/control techniques, escort holds, armbar, emergency handcuffing, and closed hand strike/punch. Neither the checkboxes completed nor the TRR narrative indicated the officer used a takedown. However, in their statement to the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), the officer explained that they had, in fact, used of a takedown during the incident. In a third incident, three accused officers responded to a fight among a large group of subjects, and COPA’s summary report stated that one of the responding officers “flung” the subject to the ground. Following the incident, the involved officer failed to complete a TRR indicating a takedown. Each of these cases of TRR non-reporting or under-reporting came to OIG’s attention because they were part of the record in a completed disciplinary investigation.

42 FRD is a unit within CPD’s Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform that conducts reviews of reported uses of force for the purposes of “identify[ing] any patterns, trends, or emerging concerns relative to the reviewed use-of-force incidents and recommend specific modifications to existing policy, procedures, training, tactics, or equipment.” “General Order G03-02-08 Department Review of Use of Force,” January 27, 2021, accessed September 7, 2021, https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6577. One form of internal Department oversight of TRR compliance does exist, in that supervising officers are required to sign off on TRRs when CPD members under their command deploy a reportable use of force.
fled and no information [is] known, or when the TRR is for destruction of an animal.” Members also have the option to select “Unknown / Refused” for race/ethnicity on the electronic reporting system version of the TRR.

In some cases, different CPD members completing TRRs for a single subject will assign different race/ethnicity categories. This only affects a small percentage of all cases, but it is an important limitation on the precision of the analysis presented in this report. CPD members’ perceptions of subjects’ racial and ethnic identities are relevant and instructive—in fact, members’ perceptions are arguably more relevant than subjects’ self-identifications in an analysis of disparities that are the consequences of officer actions. Nonetheless, OIG’s findings should be understood in light of the fact that data on subject race is likely based on members’ perceptions rather than subjects’ self-identifications.

The classifications of subject “race” that CPD members use in their use of force reporting likewise impose some methodological limitations on OIG’s analysis. The “race” data field on the TRR allows officers to pick from a list that includes both racial and ethnic categories. Specifically, the options listed are Black (BLK), White (WHI), White Hispanic (WWH), Black Hispanic (WBH), “Spanish DO NOT USE” (S), American Indian / Alaskan Native (I), Asian / Pacific Islander (API), and Unknown (U). For purposes of this analysis, OIG has combined the “Black Hispanic,” “White Hispanic,” and the largely defunct “Spanish DO NOT USE” categories into a single category as “Hispanic.” These categories combine a race designation (Black, White) with an ethnicity (Hispanic). While combining WBH and WWH into a “Hispanic” category collapses parts of two racial groups into an overlapping ethnic group (i.e., Black and White [racial categories] into Hispanic [an ethnic category]), the alternative possible treatment of this data—grouping those coded as Black Hispanic into the “Black” category and grouping those coded as White Hispanic into the "White" category—would make it impossible to include any analysis of police use of force against ethnically Hispanic individuals as a group. As such, OIG opted to include "Hispanic" as a standalone category.

Finding 3 below reports results of statistical analyses in which OIG assessed use of force outcomes for subjects who are members of a given racial/ethnic group versus those who are not members of that group. The results of these tests are reported below in terms of comparative outcomes for “Black” subjects versus “Non-Black” subjects, for “White” subjects versus “Non-White” subjects, and for “Hispanic” subjects versus “Non-Hispanic” subjects, where as described above OIG constructed the “Hispanic” category to include individuals who were coded on the TRR as “Black Hispanic” and “White Hispanic.”


44 In the period of analysis, 1,229 TRRs were completed indicating subject race as “White Hispanic,” 72 TRRs were completed indicating subject race as “Black Hispanic,” and 5 TRRs were completed indicating subject race with the category of “Spanish,” which is no longer intended for use.
F. QUALITATIVE CASE ANALYSIS OF POLICE STOPS AND USES OF FORCE

Quantitative data analysis is the foundation for the findings reported here, and this quantitative analysis is limited by two characteristics that differentiate it from qualitative case analysis. First, because quantitative data analysis strips away descriptive detail and context from individual cases, it is not a very effective vehicle for conveying the human stakes in use-of-force encounters. Second, the quantitative analysis of TRRs presented here does not reveal anything about the sequencing of use-of-force events—the critically important ordering of force mitigation efforts by CPD members, uses of force, and subject resistance. In recognition of the contextual limitations of quantitative analysis, OIG reviewed body worn camera footage and TRR narratives for selected use-of-force incidents. OIG reports on some cases in Appendix C. As the U.S. Supreme Court said of police stops in *Terry v. Ohio*, use-of-force incidents are “incredibly rich in diversity.”45 OIG presents the basic facts and sequences of events from a small number of incidents that occurred within the period of analysis as demonstrative of some of that diversity and complexity in concrete detail. While individual case studies are therefore illustrative, none of them should be taken as representative of the full population of use-of-force incidents or any defined sub-population.

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III. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

A. OBJECTIVES

The objective of this evaluation was to identify any evidence of race- or ethnicity-based disparities in CPD’s use of force. This entailed separate assessments of the following:

1. Is there evidence of race- or ethnicity-based disparities in the frequency of police-subject contacts that expose members of the public to the possibility of being subjected to a use of force?
2. Is there evidence of disparities in CPD’s use of force on the basis of subject race or ethnicity?
3. Is there evidence of disparities in CPD’s employment of force mitigation efforts prior to and during use-of-force incidents on the basis of subject race or ethnicity?

B. SCOPE

OIG evaluated CPD-reported investigatory stops, traffic stops, and uses of force at the level of takedown or above reported from October 17, 2017, through February 28, 2020. The quantitative results are reported as descriptive statistics. Finding 3 below includes tables of odds ratios, which report the relative odds of racial/ethnic groups being subjected to a use of force at or above a certain level of severity. OIG calculated hundreds of odds ratios across different subsets of the data (controlling for subject action, officer action, subject sex, and District Tier), and the descriptive results reported in Finding 3 were consistent across these different subsets of the data (Appendix B). As noted in the Background section, OIG did not set thresholds for statistical significance when running these analyses.

This report does not include any case-specific evaluations or investigatory conclusions that would be necessary to support a determination as to whether, in an individual incident, a CPD member used force that was excessive or in violation of CPD’s policy commitment to impartial policing.46 Police officers are required to have reasonable articulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop or a traffic stop, and this report does not analyze the validity of CPD members’ determinations of reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause.47 In any instance in which

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47 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court established that police may temporarily stop and detain a person if the police have “reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). The Illinois Compiled Statutes codifies the holding in Terry at 725 ICS 5/107-14 and 725 ICS 5/108-1.01. CPD’s directives state, “Reasonable Articulable Suspicion is an objective legal standard that is less than probable cause but more substantial than a hunch or general suspicion. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances which the sworn member observes and the reasonable inferences that are drawn based on the sworn member’s training and experience. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion can result from
OIG uncovered evidence suggestive of possible misconduct during the course of this review, OIG referred that evidence to the Civilian Office of Police Accountability for appropriate disciplinary investigation.

Finally, this report does not evaluate the causes of the observed disparities in use of force and therefore does not propose recommendations to CPD associated with the findings. The findings reported here do, however, raise important questions for further analysis that are likely to have policy implications. OIG outlines these questions for further analysis in the conclusion section below.

C. METHODOLOGY

The Background section introduces the data analyzed in this report and the value and limitations of that data for assessing disparities in several phases of police-subject interactions. OIG publishes continuously updated dashboards that allow interested readers to independently access data on ISRs and TRRs, as analyzed in this report. OIG’s ISR dashboards contain information on completed and approved ISRs since January 1, 2016, including the demographics of the involved CPD member(s) and subject(s) and the location of the stop by CPD District and ward. OIG’s TRR dashboards contain information on completed TRRs since January 1, 2015, including the demographics of the involved CPD member(s) and subject(s) and the locations of reported incidents by CPD District, ward, and community area. The TRR Levels of Force dashboard specifically contains data displays that allow users to replicate and extend the analyses reported below on disparities in force mitigation efforts and severity of uses of force (Findings 3 and 4).

OIG obtained traffic stop data via a production request to CPD for all traffic stops initiated by a CPD member as required by Illinois Traffic and Pedestrian Stop Statistical Survey (TPSSS) from October 2017 through February 2020. As of February 2022, continuously updating TPSSS data is not publicly available from either OIG or CPD.

OIG supplemented its quantitative analysis of ISR, TPSSS, and TRR data with a qualitative review of TRR narratives and available body worn cameras from selected use-of-force incidents during the period of analysis. Multiple criteria were used to identify cases for review. OIG viewed video, where available, for use-of-force incidents that resulted in an unusually high number of uses of force being deployed against a single subject, either by multiple officers or by a single officer.


OIG also reviewed TRR narratives to identify subject-incidents of potential interest for inclusion as case studies in Appendix C. The cases presented in Appendix C do not constitute a probability sample. The cases are useful for demonstrating the case-specific complexities, and sometimes ambiguities, of use-of-force incidents. As argued in the conclusion of this report, the case studies may also be valuable for identifying directions for future research. But they are not a proper basis for drawing inferences to the full population of use-of-force incidents.

In addition to the data analysis methods outlined above and in the Background section, OIG reviewed CPD policies and reporting forms related to use of force for the period of analysis and relevant training materials from 2017 through 2021. OIG also interviewed personnel from CPD’s Force Review Division.

D. STANDARDS

OIG conducted this review in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, Evaluations, and Reviews by Offices of Inspector General found in the Association of Inspectors General’s Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspector General (i.e., “The Green Book”).

E. AUTHORITY AND ROLE

The authority to perform this audit is established in the City of Chicago Municipal Code §§ 2-56-030 and -230(d), which confer on OIG the power and duty to review the programs of City government in order to identify any inefficiencies, waste, and potential for misconduct, and to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the administration of City programs and operations, and, specifically, to review and audit CPD’s policies, practices, programs, and training “with respect to constitutional policing . . . and use of force.” The role of OIG is to review City operations and make recommendations for improvement. City management is responsible for establishing and maintaining processes to ensure that City programs operate economically, efficiently, effectively, and with integrity. Further, Paragraph 561 of the consent decree entered in Illinois v. Chicago requires OIG’s Public Safety section to “review CPD actions for potential bias, including racial bias.”

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IV. FINDINGS

FINDING 1: DURING THE PERIOD OF ANALYSIS, BLACK PEOPLE WERE OVERWHELMINGLY DISPROPORTIONATELY STOPPED BY CPD, REGARDLESS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION AND CRIME LEVEL IN THE DISTRICT OF THE STOP

The quantitative evidence from investigatory stop and traffic stop data shows an overwhelming disparity in the rates at which Black and non-Black people were stopped by the police. The overrepresentation of Black people among those stopped by the police was consistent across traffic stops and investigatory stops, and it was persistent across every CPD District, notwithstanding differences in District crime rates and the demographic composition of District populations.

As noted above in section II-B, Findings 1 and 2 are based on analysis of the full universe of traffic and investigatory stops in the period of analysis, which resulted in 34% of the reported use-of-force incidents in that period. The focused analysis of stops is possible due to mandated reporting and data collection practices that apply to police traffic and pedestrian stops in Illinois, which are not in place for other forms of police encounters.

A. ANALYSIS

Black people were overrepresented—relative to their share of population in the District—in investigatory stops in every CPD District. In several Districts where the Black share of population is low, the gap is extremely wide. For example, in CPD’s 18th District, the population is 7.9% Black, and 73.5% of investigatory stops were of Black people. Even in Districts in which the population is overwhelmingly Black, Black people were still overrepresented. For example, in CPD’s 6th District, the population is 95.9% Black, and 97.2% of investigatory stops were of Black people.

Given an investigatory stop, Black people were subjected to a search of their person 1.5 times more frequently than non-Black people, and also subjected to a pat-down 1.5 times more frequently than non-Black people.

Similarly, Black people were overrepresented, relative to their share of population in the District, in traffic stops in all but two CPD Districts. The two CPD Districts in which Black people were not overrepresented among subjects of traffic stops are the 11th and 15th Districts. In the 11th District, the population is 78.7% Black, and 77.7% of traffic stops were of Black people. In the 15th District, the population is 89.7% Black, and 82.9% of the traffic stops were of Black people.
Given a traffic stop, Black people were also subjected to a vehicle search more often than non-Black people. Black motorists’ vehicles were searched in 0.95% of traffic stops, which made searches of Black motorists’ vehicles 3.3 times more frequent than searches of White motorists’ vehicles (0.29% of traffic stops of White motorists) and 1.6 times more frequent than searches of all non-Black motorists’ vehicles (0.60% of traffic stops of all non-Black motorists).

By contrast, across CPD Districts, White people were underrepresented or represented proportional to their share of the District population in investigatory and traffic stops. There is no clear trend in one direction or the other as to whether Hispanic people across Districts were over- or underrepresented in stops. See Appendix A for all percentages by District and stop type.

Investigatory stops and traffic stops were both concentrated in higher crime Districts, according the crime level Tiers into which CPD organizes its Districts. Specifically, these types of police stops were more concentrated in CPD’s Tier 1 Districts than in Tier 2 Districts, and in turn they are more concentrated in Tier 2 Districts than in Tiers 3 & 4 Districts. If stops were evenly distributed across Districts in all Tiers, then Figure 3 would show stops in each Tier approximately at the level of the population living within the Districts in each Tier: the light and dark blue bars representing stops would all be at approximately the same height as the black lines representing population. What Figure 3 shows instead is that both types of stops are more likely to occur in the higher crime Districts (Tier 1) than population of those Districts alone would predict. There is an 18.6 percentage point gap between the proportion of ISRs in Tier 1 Districts (39.1% of all ISRs across the City) and the population living within those Districts (20.5% of the total city population). There is, similarly, a 17.5 percentage point gap between the proportion of traffic stops in Tier 1 Districts (38.0% of all traffic stops across the city) and the population percentage (20.5%). Investigatory and traffic stops occur in Tier 2 Districts at rates close to what District population would predict, and they occur in Tier 3 and 4 Districts at rates below what District population alone would predict.

FIGURE 4: Concentration of ISRs and traffic stops by District Tiers

Source: OIG analysis.

The concentration of stops in higher-Tier Districts does not fully account for the disproportionate representation of Black people in stops. Investigatory and traffic stops are each more highly concentrated in majority Black Districts than they are in Tier 1 Districts (Figure 5). Figure 5 below
shows similar data to Figure 4, but Districts are grouped by the demographic group that makes up their majority population rather than by Tier. Figure 5 shows that there is a 23.6 percentage point gap between the proportion of ISRs in majority Black Districts (50.9%) and the population living within those Districts (27.3% of the total City population). There is a 26.5 percentage point gap between the proportion of traffic stops in majority Black Districts (53.8%) and the population percentage (27.3%). These percentage point gaps are larger in majority Black Districts than in Tier 1 Districts. While there is a high degree of overlap between Tier 1 Districts and majority Black Districts, Figures 3 and 4 taken together show that the concentration of stops in Tier 1 Districts is insufficient to explain the full extent of the concentration of stops in majority Black Districts. Meanwhile, investigatory and traffic stops in majority Hispanic Districts and in majority White Districts occur at lower rates than what District population alone would predict.

**FIGURE 5:** Concentration of ISRs and traffic stops by District demographics

![Figure 5](image)

Source: OIG analysis.

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52 Majority Black Districts are the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 11th, 15th, and 22nd. Majority Hispanic Districts are the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 25th. Majority White Districts are the 1st, 16th, 18th, 19th, and 20th. The 12th, 14th, 17th, and 24th Districts, according to the most recent available census information, do not have any single racial/ethnic group that makes up the majority of the District population. Tier 1 Districts are the 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 15th. Tier 2 Districts are the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 22nd, and 25th. Tier 3 Districts are the 12th, 14th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 24th. Tier 4 Districts are the 1st, 16th, and 20th.
The data presented here does not support any assessment about what proportion of the stops of Black people are justified under the law or CPD’s policies. Nor does the clear empirical evidence of disparities prove racial bias in officers’ decisions to stop the particular people whom they stop. Nonetheless, in the context of this report on use-of-force disparities, the importance of the result is that race-based disparities stops contribute to race-based disparities ultimately observable in data on use of force by CPD members. Findings 2 and 3 below show that there are race-based disparities in subsequent phases of police-subject interactions as well, compounding the disparities at the earliest phase of interaction. Figure 7 below demonstrates this compounding effect with Citywide investigatory stop data.
Compounding Disparity in Citywide Investigatory Stops and Uses of Force

Citywide Population: 2,682,122

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Non-Black</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>809,557</td>
<td>1,872,565</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stops</td>
<td>230,353</td>
<td>106,737</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the population stopped to the population that was subject to a use of force following an investigatory stop, it would appear that there is a racial disparity: Black people were 2.4 times more likely to face a use of force following an investigatory stop than non-Black people.

Comparing the population of the city to the population that was subject to the use of force after a stop, however, the disparity looks several times greater: Black people were 11.7 times more likely to face a use of force following an investigatory stop than non-Black people.*

*Note: Some individual people may have faced multiple use of force incidents within the period of analysis.

Source: OIG analysis.
FINDING 2: AMONG PEOPLE WHOM CPD MEMBERS STOPPED IN A TRAFFIC OR INVESTIGATORY STOP DURING THE PERIOD OF ANALYSIS, BLACK PEOPLE WERE DISPROPORTIONATELY SUBJECTED TO FORCE, REGARDLESS OF DISTRICT DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION AND DISTRICT CRIME LEVEL

CPD officers’ uses of force following investigatory and traffic stops further compound the overrepresentation of Black people that begins with their overrepresentation in stops. As established above in Finding 1, Black people were much more likely to be subjects of an investigatory or traffic stop than non-Black people, a difference that is not fully accounted for by the greater concentration of stops in Tier 1 Districts. Finding 2 reports that within the set of people stopped by CPD in a traffic or investigatory stop, Black people were disproportionately likely to be subjects of force.

A. ANALYSIS

Black people were overrepresented—relative to their share of those stopped—in investigatory stops that lead to uses of force in 17 out of 22 CPD Districts (77%). Of the 5 out of 22 Districts in which Black people were not overrepresented in investigatory stops that led to uses of force, three are Districts in which more than 9 in every 10 investigatory stops were of Black people (the 2nd, 3rd, and 15th Districts). Across those three Districts, on average, 95.5% of subjects of investigatory stops were Black, while the average proportion of Black people among those subjected to uses of force following investigatory stops was 89.4%. The remaining two Districts where the pattern did not hold are the 16th and 19th Districts. In the 16th District, 17.9% of investigatory stops were of Black people and 15.4% of uses of force following investigatory stops were of Black people. In the 19th District, the numbers were 52.1% and 47.4%, respectively.

Black people were also overrepresented, relative to their share of those stopped, in traffic stops that lead to uses of force in all but one CPD District. The sole exception (the 17th District) had the lowest number of uses of force following traffic stops of any District (3 total) and had no uses of force following traffic stops of Black motorists. In four Districts—the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th—one or more than 93% of all traffic stops were of Black motorists, and in each one of these Districts, Black motorists were still overrepresented in traffic stops that resulted in a use of force. In those Districts, the proportions of Black people who were subjects of uses of force following traffic stops were: 100% (3rd District), 96.6% (5th District), 100% (6th District), and 98.5% (7th District).

Across all CPD Districts, White people were either underrepresented or proportionally represented—relative to their share of police stops—in uses of force following those stops (see Appendix A). There is no clear trend in one direction or the other as to whether Hispanic people
across Districts were over- or underrepresented in uses of force following stop. See Appendix A for all percentages by District.

Figures 8 and 9 show how the disadvantage to Black people compounds from police stops to police stops that result in uses of force in most of CPD’s Districts: 21 of 22 for traffic stops (95%) and 17 of 22 for investigatory stops (77%). In the figures below, the three data points along the thick blue line represent the proportion of Black people in the citywide population, the proportion of Black people among all those stopped by CPD citywide, and finally the proportion of Black people among subjects of force following stops citywide. The progressive increase in these data points shows a compounding disadvantage to Black people. The thinner, unlabeled grey lines each represent one CPD District, and they show that disadvantage tends to compound for Black people in most individual Districts as well as citywide.
FIGURE 8: Proportion of investigatory stops and investigatory stops with uses of force, with Black subjects

Each grey line represents one CPD District.

Even in Districts with populations that are over 90% Black, Black subjects tend to be overrepresented in investigatory stops and in investigatory stops with uses of force.

Citywide, Black subjects experience 83.4% of investigatory stops that end in a reportable use of force.

Citywide, Black subjects experience 68.3% of investigatory stops.

Citywide, Black people are 30.2% of Chicago’s population.

Source: OIG analysis.
FIGURE 9: Proportion of traffic stops, and traffic stops with uses of force, with Black subjects

Source: OIG analysis.
Finding 1 shows that Black people were disproportionately likely to be stopped by the police in an investigatory or a traffic stop; Finding 2 shows that, within the population of people who are stopped in either an investigatory or traffic stop, Black people were disproportionately likely to experience a reportable use of force. Finding 3 shows several results related to the whole population of individuals who experienced a reportable use of force: (1) CPD uses lower-level force options more frequently than higher-level force options against all people; (2) Black people experienced every force option more often than non-Black people, and (3) in general, Black people had higher odds of facing higher-level force options than non-Black people. In the period of analysis, the highest level of force—lethal force—was deployed against 60 individuals: 46 people coded as Black on the TRRs, 10 coded as Hispanic, 2 coded as Asian / Pacific Islander, and 2 coded as Unknown.

Whereas Findings 1 and 2 analyzed data on investigatory stops, traffic stops, and police uses of force stemming from those incidents, Finding 3 analyzes data on all use-of-force incidents that took place in the period of analysis, whether they occurred after a police stop or in some other context.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{A. ANALYSIS}

Within the population of individuals who experienced a reportable use of force during the period of analysis, the majority of people (2,446 out of 4,534, or 54\%) were subjected to the lowest-level reportable use of force: a takedown. Those subjected to use of a less-lethal weapon account for 12\% of the total (534 subject-incidents), while those subjected to lethal force account for 1\% of the total (60 subject-incidents) (Figure 10). This population was most likely to be reported on TRRs as having “attacked without weapon” (1,286 subject-incidents), followed by “fled” (1,130 subject-incidents) and “pulled away” (893 subject-incidents). One hundred and thirty-nine (139) subjects were reported as having “used deadly force” (Figure 11). For both officer actions and subject actions, these counts reflect the highest level action reported on one or more TRRs for the subject-incident. For example, if a subject is reported as having “pulled away” and “threatened battery without weapon,” then that subject is depicted in Figure 11 as having “threatened battery without weapon.” Similarly, if a single officer reported using manual

\textsuperscript{53}Refer to the Background section of this report for a detailed outline of the data available to assess disparities in different phases of use-of-force incidents and the data limitations that informed OIG’s selection of different datasets to conduct different pieces of analysis for this report.
force and a less-lethal weapon against a single subject, then that officer is depicted in Figure 9 as having used a less-lethal weapon.

FIGURE 10: Highest reported level of force used by CPD, count of incidents

![Graph showing the highest reported level of force used by CPD](image)

Source: OIG analysis.

FIGURE 11: Highest reported level of subject action, count of incidents

![Graph showing the highest reported level of subject action](image)

Source: OIG analysis.
Black people constituted the majority of those subjected to a use of force and were more likely to face a higher-level force option than non-Black people (Figure 12). Thirteen percent (13%) of Black people who faced a use of force were subjected to a less-lethal weapon or a lethal weapon, whereas 9% of White people were subjected to a less-lethal weapon and none were subjected to lethal weapon force in the period of analysis (Figure 13).

**FIGURE 12: Count of all subjects by race/ethnicity and level of force used**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian / PI</th>
<th>Native American</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>3,568</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4,534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**FIGURE 13: Incidents involving less lethal or lethal force as highest force level**

Source: OIG analysis.

When controlling for subject actions as reported on TRRs, the pattern of greater force deployed against Black people remains clear for those who are reported as having fled (n = 1,130) or attacked a CPD member without a weapon (n = 1,286), or used a weapon (n = 416). For each of these subject actions, Black people had higher odds of being subjects of less-lethal weapon or

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lethal weapon force than their non-Black counterparts. The same pattern is not visible in the data for subjects whose level of resistance was at the lowest level of force analyzed (pulled away, n = 893) or at the highest level reported on the TRR (used deadly force, n = 139).

As introduced in the Background section, OIG calculated odds ratios to assess these odds, comparing groups of subjects who were reported on TRRs as having engaged in the same level of resistance during the use-of-force incident. Each cell in Figures 15–17 below and in Appendix B is calculated by comparing two ratios. As an example, Figure 14 shows the underlying numbers that go into computing one cell of Figure 15. OIG’s Levels of Force dashboard that accompanies the publication of this report allows readers to generate the numbers underlying all odds ratios reported in this analysis, as well as other odds ratios, to make comparisons of interest between race groups, sex groups, and other subsets of the TRR data.

**FIGURE 14:** An example odds ratio calculation: the odds of facing less-lethal weapon force or more severe force when fleeing, for Black people versus non-Black people

In the example above, the odds that a fleeing Black subject receives less-lethal weapon force or more severe force are 114-to-836 (0.1364), and the odds that a fleeing non-Black subject receives less-lethal weapon force or more severe force are 13-to-156 (0.0833). The odds ratio for Black versus non-Black subjects fleeing and facing a force level at or above that of a less-lethal weapon is given by the equation:
(1) \( \frac{114}{836} + \frac{13}{156} = 0.1364 \div 0.0833 = 1.6 \)

An odds ratio value higher than 1 indicates that the group being analyzed (in Figure 14, Black people) had higher odds of facing the level of force in question or a higher level of force (in Figure 14, less-lethal weapon force) as opposed to less severe force than the force level in question, when compared to individuals who were not in that group (in Figure 14, non-Black people), given the same subject action.

Figure 15 further shows that the odds of a more severe use of force were consistently higher for Black people than for non-Black people in the middle of the range of subject actions: fleeing, threatening battery without a weapon, and attacking without a weapon. The total number of subject-incidents that provides the basis for each odds ratio calculation is given in each column of Figure 15.

**Figure 15: Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, Black people vs. non-Black people**

The steps to calculate the odds ratio in this cell are explained in Figure 14 above.

Source: OIG analysis.

For subjects who were reported to have used deadly force, Hispanic people were more likely to face a higher-level force option than non-Hispanic people (see the rightmost column in Figure 16). Meanwhile, White people were almost never more likely to face a higher-level use of force than non-White people. This can be seen in Figure 17: odds ratios in every cell except two are less than or equal to 1, and in no cell is the odds ratio greater than 1.2. In the two cells where the odds ratios indicate higher odds of more severe force use against White people than against non-White people during the period of analysis, the odds ratios’ differences from 1.0 are very
small, as compared to the larger differences in odds seen for Black versus non-Black people and for Hispanic versus non-Hispanic people in Figures 15 and 16.

**Figure 16: Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, Hispanic people vs. Non-Hispanic people**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Threatened Battery Without Weapon</th>
<th>Attacked Without Weapon</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.87 (p = 0.58)</td>
<td>0.75 (p = 0.23)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.92 (p = 0.52)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 0.89)</td>
<td>1.3 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>1.3 (p = 0.62)</td>
<td>0.61 (p = 0.17)</td>
<td>0.76 (p = 0.53)</td>
<td>0.89 (p = 0.71)</td>
<td>0.85 (p = 0.74)</td>
<td>3.4 (p = 0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>4.2 (p = 0.29)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.4 (p = 0.66)</td>
<td>1.6 (p = 0.41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis.

**Figure 17: Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, White people vs non-White people**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Threatened Battery Without Weapon</th>
<th>Attacked Without Weapon</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.58 (p = 0.13)</td>
<td>0.69 (p = 0.33)</td>
<td>1.2 (p = 0.72)</td>
<td>0.78 (p = 0.28)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.24 (p = 0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.78 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.51 (p = 0.35)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 0.81)</td>
<td>0.55 (p = 0.15)</td>
<td>0.64 (p = 0.62)</td>
<td>0.43 (p = 0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 0.06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis.

When controls are introduced for the Department-defined crime level Tiers along with controls for subject action, the number of subject-incidents represented in each contingency table
decreases, and the calculated odds ratios become more volatile and therefore become less likely to be stable under differently defined comparison groups. Nonetheless, after introducing Tier controls, the pattern of Black disadvantage relative to non-Black counterparts was consistent for subjects who fled or threatened battery across all Tier groups (see the first three tables in Appendix B). Black individuals also faced higher odds of being subjected to less-lethal weapon force (relative to any less severe option) when an incident occurs in Tier 3 or Tier 4 Districts. This pattern holds across all levels of subject action (table 3 in Appendix B).

At lower levels of subject resistance (pulling away), no racial/ethnic group is faced with a consistent pattern of disadvantage after controlling for Tier. For subjects who were reported to have used deadly force, Hispanic people had higher odds than non-Hispanic people of facing a higher-level force option in most cases even after controlling for Tier, consistent with the result in Figure 16 above (see tables 4–6 in Appendix B).
FINDING 4: FOR THE POPULATION THAT FACED AT LEAST ONE USE OF FORCE, OIG FOUND NO CONSISTENT EVIDENCE OF RACIAL/ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN CPD’S APPLICATION OF FORCE MITIGATION EFFORTS OR IN CPD’S APPLICATION OF MULTIPLE, SEPARATELY REPORTED USES OF FORCE

This finding reports on aspects of use-of-force interactions for which OIG found no consistent evidence of racial or ethnic disparity. For the population that faced at least one use of force, OIG found no consistent evidence of racial/ethnic disparities in (1) the application of force mitigation efforts or (2) the application of multiple, separately reported uses of force.

Specifically, the number of efforts that CPD members report making to mitigate use-of-force interactions shows no pattern on the basis of subject race/ethnicity. Similarly, while Black people were much more likely to face a use of force in the first place (see Findings 1 and 2) and were more likely to face a more severe force option (Finding 3), Black people who faced at least one use of force were not more likely, on average, to face a larger number of separately reported force deployments than their White or Hispanic counterparts who faced at least one use of force.55

A. ANALYSIS

FORCE MITIGATION EFFORTS

OIG found no consistent evidence of racial/ethnic disparities in the application of force mitigation efforts. The distribution of the number of force mitigation efforts by race/ethnicity is similar for Black, Hispanic, and White people (Figure 18). Across all subject-incidents, CPD members employed an average of 3.63 force mitigation efforts in interactions with Black people, with 2.3% of interactions involving fewer than two force mitigation efforts. CPD members employed an average of 3.68 force mitigation efforts in interactions with Hispanic people, with 2.1% of interactions involving fewer than two force mitigation efforts. CPD members employed an average of 3.71 force mitigation efforts in interactions with White people, with 4.3% of interactions involving fewer than two force mitigation efforts. White subjects were more likely to receive 6 force mitigation efforts and Black and Hispanic subjects somewhat less likely, and White subjects were less likely to receive 3 force mitigation efforts and Black and Hispanic

55 TRRs do not consistently capture all multiple uses of a single type of force by a single officer. For example, an officer who kicked a person twice or more would fill in the same checkbox, “Kick,” as an officer who kicked a person once. Therefore, when identifying multiple-use-of-force incidents for analysis, OIG was able to identify cases in which multiple force types were deployed by a single officer (e.g., a kick and an elbow strike, or a kick and a Taser). But given data limitations, OIG did not attempt to count incidents of multiple deployments of a single force type by a single officer against a single subject (e.g., two kicks by one officer, or two Taser discharges by one officer) as multiple-use-of-force incidents for the purposes of this analysis.
subjects somewhat more likely. But these differences do not extend as a pattern across the rest of the frequency distributions and therefore do not amount to consistent evidence of disparities: whereas White people were more likely to face six force mitigation efforts, they were less likely to face either five or seven force mitigation efforts.

FIGURE 18: Force mitigation efforts reported in use-of-force events by race/ethnicity

![Bar chart showing force mitigation efforts by race/ethnicity.](chart)

Source: OIG analysis.

CPD members report using two or more force mitigation efforts in the overwhelming majority (98%) of use-of-force incidents, and these force mitigation efforts are mostly evenly distributed across racial/ethnic groups. However, because there is no data available on force mitigation efforts in encounters that did not result in any reportable use of force, it is not possible to draw final conclusions about whether there are race- or ethnicity-based disparities in the application of force mitigation efforts by CPD members. It is only possible to observe that, based on the available evidence, there is no consistent racial disparity in the application of force mitigation efforts during incidents that result in a use of force.

MULTIPLE, SEPARATELY REPORTED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

In the period of analysis, 2,528 subject-incidents involved a single type of reportable force deployment against a single subject: for example, the use of a Taser by one officer, manual striking by one officer, or a takedown by one officer. This is slightly more than half (56%) of the total number of subject-incidents that OIG analyzed (4,534). The remainder of subject-incidents—44% or 2,006—involves two or more separately reported force deployments: for example, a kick and a hand strike by one officer, Taser deployments by two separate officers, or a takedown by two officers.

Conditional on being subjected to multiple, separately reported uses of force, Black, White, and Hispanic people all faced on average approximately 2.7 uses of force (Figure 19). The average number for Asian / Pacific Islanders and for Native American / Alaskan Native people shows more
variability, but the number of use-of-force incidents involving these two groups is very small. Only seven Asian / Pacific Islander people and two Native American / Alaskan Native people are represented in this multiple force type data, and these numbers do not provide a population size sufficient to establish any reliable evidence as to disparity or lack of disparity.

Figure 19: Average number of force types recorded against a single subject in multiple-use-of-force incidents, by racial/ethnic group

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<tr>
<th>Racial/Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Average Force Types</th>
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<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native American / Alaskan Native</td>
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</table>

Source: OIG analysis.

Figure 19 shows the average force type counts by racial/ethnic group for people against whom CPD members deployed multiple, separately reported uses of force. Figure 20 below shows the distribution of the number of separately reported uses of force for the same population of incidents. The distributions are similar for each racial and ethnic group: people in any racial/ethnic group are more likely to face two force deployments than three force type deployments, more likely to face three than four, and so on.\(^{56}\)

Figure 20: Number of uses of force recorded in multiple-use-of-force incidents, by race/ethnicity

Because there are many more Black people than non-Black people represented in this dataset, the absolute numbers are higher at every level for Black people than for all other racial/ethnic groups combined. Black people account for 79% of those who face two separately reported uses of force in a single encounter, 79% of those who face three, 81% of those who face four, 78% of

\(^{56}\) Figure 20 shows “6+” separately reported uses of force as a single category and shows that “6+” separately reported uses of force occurred for Hispanic people more frequently than 5 (13 times versus 7 times). Breaking out the “6+” category, Hispanic subjects received six separately reported uses of force 6 times, seven separately reported uses of force 6 times, and eight separately reported uses of force one time.
those who face five, and 70% of those who face six or more. The overrepresentation of Black people in these incidents involving multiple, separately reported uses of force is a reminder of the compounding disparity through use-of-force interactions that has been a theme of this report. The risks and harms of multiple-use-of-force incidents fall disproportionately on Black people, even though there is no consistent evidence of racial/ethnic disparity in the number of separately reported uses of force that a person is likely to face, given that they are the subject of a use of force in the first place. The overrepresentation of Black people in Figure 19 reflects the much greater likelihood that they will be subject to a use of force in the first instance, as established in Findings 1 and 2.
V. CONCLUSION

There is strong evidence of race-based disparities in CPD’s use of force, as established by an analysis of stops and use-of-force incidents from October 17, 2017, through February 28, 2020. Disparities manifest and compound across multiple phases of use-of-force incidents. At all phases where clear evidence of disparities exists, Black people are the most consistently disadvantaged racial/ethnic group.

The earliest phase of many police-civilian interactions that lead to uses of force—an officer’s stop of someone in an investigatory or traffic stop—manifests stark race-based disparities. OIG also found race-based disparities in the level of force officers deployed, even after imposing granular controls for subject action and for the crime rates in the area of the incident, following CPD’s use of a tiering system to group Districts by level of public violence. As more use of force data is collected over time in OIG’s Levels of Force dashboard, it will be possible to revisit these findings with larger population sizes, which may present clearer or different patterns and may permit robust analyses with additional controls in place—for example, for subject sex, subject age, subject reported alcohol/drug use, or the context of the use-of-force incident.57

This evaluation found no consistent evidence of race-based disparities in officers’ use of force mitigation efforts. This is an important result, although it is limited by the fact that incidents where force mitigation efforts successfully averted a reportable use of force are not observed in the TRR data.

This report is limited to descriptive analysis of use-of-force outcomes. It does not evaluate the causes of observed disparities in use-of-force interactions and does not reach recommendations for how CPD should begin to remedy those disparities. The data on disparities in use of force, and the underlying use of force events themselves, are complex enough that a first report is necessary to establish an appropriately detailed descriptive account of use-of-force outcomes. Establishing a rigorous understanding of cause would require different types of testing, for which this report can serve as a foundation.

The analyses OIG conducted in this report raise questions about core areas of police strategy and practice that merit further consideration as CPD, OIG, and the broader public seek a better understanding of the patterns of racial disparity documented here. Important questions for further inquiry include the following:

- Force mitigation training and practice
  - How frequently do force mitigation efforts wholly avert a potential use-of-force incident?

• What is the range of officer actions that are coded as “force mitigation” on TRRs, and do all of these actions consistently contribute to mitigating the need for force in practice?

• Use of force in response to mental health crisis situations
  o How does the subset of use-of-force incidents involving subjects in mental health crisis resemble the total population of use-of-force incidents, and how are they different?
  o Are similar race- and ethnicity-based disparities observable in this subset of incidents?
  o Are these incidents most likely to involve specific types of subject actions or specific force mitigation or force deployment responses by officers?

• Individual officer decision authority in initiating stops
  o This report showed striking disparities in the rates at which Black people and non-Black people are stopped in traffic and investigatory stops. To what degree is this difference driven by strategic decisions at the command staff level—such as decisions about where to deploy officers—versus individual officers’ decision making about whom to stop and why?

• Racial disparity in arrests and use of force in arrest contexts
  o Findings 1 and 2 of this report identified racial disparities in exposure to investigatory and traffic stops. Just as many use-of-force incidents are reported as occurring in the contexts of investigatory or traffic stops, many use-of-force incidents are reported as occurring in contexts where officers are pursuing or arresting subjects or transporting or guarding arrestees (see Figure 1). Findings 1 and 2 of this report did not analyze racial disparities in arrests, leaving for future inquiry the question, do arrests contribute to compounding disparities in the same way that this report finds that stops do?

• Firearm pointing
  o Are there race- and ethnicity-based disparities in the pointing of firearms? This question was beyond scope of this evaluation, because firearm pointing is an officer action that is not reported on TRRs and not reported with associated information about subject demographics or subject actions.

OIG may publish future evaluations that look more closely at the mechanisms driving disparate outcomes reported here, potentially including the areas of inquiry proposed above.
## APPENDIX A: INVESTIGATORY STOP AND TRAFFIC STOP RATES BY DISTRICT AND SUBJECT RACE/ETHNICITY

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Racial / Ethnic Group</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th>% of ISRs</th>
<th>% of ISRs with TRRs</th>
<th>% of Traffic Stops</th>
<th>% of Traffic Stops with TRRs</th>
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<td>11th District</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th District</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th District</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th District</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th District</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th District</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th District</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th District</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th District</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd District</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th District</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th District</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>District Total ISRs</td>
<td>District Total Traffic Stops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st District</td>
<td>71,374</td>
<td>12,271</td>
<td>31,397</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd District</td>
<td>90,869</td>
<td>13,057</td>
<td>78,044</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd District</td>
<td>71,742</td>
<td>12,233</td>
<td>57,798</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th District</td>
<td>117,200</td>
<td>29,299</td>
<td>103,922</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th District</td>
<td>71,524</td>
<td>16,454</td>
<td>39,848</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th District</td>
<td>88,216</td>
<td>19,510</td>
<td>64,223</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th District</td>
<td>59,346</td>
<td>32,439</td>
<td>139,601</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th District</td>
<td>252,751</td>
<td>23,598</td>
<td>68,098</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th District</td>
<td>163,805</td>
<td>20,436</td>
<td>55,916</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th District</td>
<td>109,776</td>
<td>18,634</td>
<td>52,454</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th District</td>
<td>71,185</td>
<td>27,291</td>
<td>91,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th District</td>
<td>130,043</td>
<td>12,454</td>
<td>74,533</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th District</td>
<td>120,893</td>
<td>9,439</td>
<td>34,987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th District</td>
<td>58,512</td>
<td>13,496</td>
<td>81,418</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th District</td>
<td>205,400</td>
<td>7,957</td>
<td>24,784</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th District</td>
<td>147,737</td>
<td>6,262</td>
<td>23,359</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th District</td>
<td>121,621</td>
<td>10,563</td>
<td>51,174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th District</td>
<td>211,038</td>
<td>8,572</td>
<td>31,628</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th District</td>
<td>81,112</td>
<td>6,204</td>
<td>38,825</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22nd District</td>
<td>103,535</td>
<td>7,732</td>
<td>30,836</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th District</td>
<td>138,941</td>
<td>11,282</td>
<td>30,937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th District</td>
<td>195,502</td>
<td>17,907</td>
<td>73,171</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: FORCE LEVELS DEPLOYED, COMPARISONS BY SUBJECT RACE/ETHNICITY WITH DISTRICT TIER AND SUBJECT SEX CONTROLS

1. Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, Black people vs. non-Black people, Tier 1 Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Subject Action / Case Count</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>356 Total Cases</td>
<td>592 Total Cases</td>
<td>Threatened Battery Without Weapon 234 Total Cases</td>
<td>552 Total Cases</td>
<td>204 Total Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.9 (p = 0.13)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.89 (p = 0.78)</td>
<td>0.86 (p = 0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.34 (p = 0.05</td>
<td>3.2 (p = 0.10)</td>
<td>1.7 (p = 0.47)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, Black people vs. non-Black people, Tier 2 Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Subject Action / Case Count</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>206 Total Cases</td>
<td>305 Total Cases</td>
<td>Threatened Battery Without Weapon 168 Total Cases</td>
<td>379 Total Cases</td>
<td>117 Total Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>2.0 (p = 0.11)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 0.85)</td>
<td>1.5 (p = 0.41)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 0.59)</td>
<td>0.89 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>1.8 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.4 (p = 0.77)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, Black people vs. non-Black people, Tier 3–4 Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Threatened Battery Without Weapon</th>
<th>Attacked Without Weapon</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>1.5 (p = 0.27)</td>
<td>1.3 (p = 0.53)</td>
<td>0.90 (p = 0.87)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 0.91)</td>
<td>1.7 (p = 0.27)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>2.0 (p = 0.48)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.2 (p = 0.84)</td>
<td>2.5 (p = 0.02)</td>
<td>2.8 (p = 0.08)</td>
<td>1.8 (p = 0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 0.35)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.75 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.79 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, Hispanic people vs. non-Hispanic people, Tier 1 Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Threatened Battery Without Weapon</th>
<th>Attacked Without Weapon</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>1.3 (p = 0.56)</td>
<td>0.64 (p = 0.36)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.4 (p = 0.37)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>2.7 (p = 0.10)</td>
<td>0.37 (p = 0.21)</td>
<td>0.65 (p = 0.51)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 0.83)</td>
<td>0.91 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>4.7 (p = 0.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, Hispanic people vs. non-Hispanic people, Tier 2 Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Threatened Battery Without Weapon</th>
<th>Attacked Without Weapon</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.72 (p = 0.55)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 0.84)</td>
<td>0.74 (p = 0.53)</td>
<td>0.80 (p = 0.45)</td>
<td>0.81 (p = 0.81)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.72 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.90 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.68 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.84 (p = 0.83)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.90 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, Hispanic people vs. non-Hispanic people, Tier 3–4 Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Threatened Battery Without Weapon</th>
<th>Attacked Without Weapon</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.72 (p = 0.56)</td>
<td>0.59 (p = 0.26)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.87 (p = 0.59)</td>
<td>0.88 (p = 0.80)</td>
<td>0.29 (p = 0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.56 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.73 (p = 0.77)</td>
<td>0.83 (p = 0.81)</td>
<td>0.71 (p = 0.53)</td>
<td>0.48 (p = 0.36)</td>
<td>1.7 (p = 0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 0.21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 (p = 0.43)</td>
<td>2.5 (p = 0.57)</td>
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7. Disparity factors for levels of force Used by CPD members, White people vs. non-White people, Tier 1 Districts

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Threatened Battery Without Weapon</th>
<th>Attacked Without Weapon</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.40 (p = 0.58)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 0.20)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.48 (p = 0.31)</td>
<td>1.2 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>3.3 (p = 0.31)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.82 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, White people vs. non-White people, Tier 2 Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Threatened Battery Without Weapon</th>
<th>Attacked Without Weapon</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 0.12)</td>
<td>0.34 (p = 0.45)</td>
<td>0.78 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.2 (p = 0.31)</td>
<td>&gt;6 (p = 0.30)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.95 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.0 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>1.2 (p = 0.73)</td>
<td>0.88 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Disparity factors for levels of force used by CPD members, White people vs. non-White people, Tier 3–4 Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Member Level of Force</th>
<th>Pulled Away</th>
<th>Fled</th>
<th>Threatened Battery Without Weapon</th>
<th>Attacked Without Weapon</th>
<th>Used Weapon</th>
<th>Used Deadly Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takedown or More Severe Force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Striking Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.70 (p = 0.43)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 0.83)</td>
<td>1.1 (p = 0.83)</td>
<td>0.95 (p = 0.89)</td>
<td>0.51 (p = 0.26)</td>
<td>0.35 (p = 0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less-Lethal Weapon Force or More Severe Force</td>
<td>0.62 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.73 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.86 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.33 (p = 0.08)</td>
<td>0.41 (p = 0.34)</td>
<td>0.24 (p = 0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (p = 1.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (p = 0.28)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C: CASE STUDIES
SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF POLICE Stops

The reasons for any given police stop are context-specific, and there are reasons why there might be race- or ethnicity-based disparities in the volume of stops that are not connected to bias-based policing. Nonetheless, the data on both traffic and investigatory stops show the disproportionate exposure of Black people to stops that present at least some risk of escalating into a use of force. The first three cases presented below are examples of stops that escalated to uses of force. Each of these three incidents was coded as an investigatory stop by the officer(s) involved on their TRRs. These three case studies are not intended to be representative of how investigatory stops play out in general; they are only illustrative of the risk that such stops can entail for subjects.

Case Study #1: An investigatory stop leading to a use of force

In this incident, an officer initiated an investigatory stop against a Black female subject in the 10th District around 7:20 p.m. The officer is captured on body worn camera (BWC) explaining to the subject that she was lawfully stopped because “you started a fire.” The subject protests her arrest but appears to acknowledge that she and others with her did start the fire, stating to the officer, “we stayed there by our fire.” The TRRs completed after the fact do not, however, mention the fire as the cause for the initial stop. According to the responding officer’s TRR narrative, “WHILE R/O [responding officer] WAS ATTEMPTING TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATORY STOP ON ABOVE SUBJECT, SUBJECT WALKED AWAY, R/O [officer] THEN RELOCATED TO THE SUBJECT’S LOCATION AND CONTINUED TO GIVE VERBAL DIRECTIONS TO SHOW HER HANDS.” BWC footage shows the responding officer exiting their vehicle and crossing the street towards the subject while their partner goes to speak with three male individuals separately. The officer instructs the subject to “get over here” and to “show me your hands now” while continuing to approach the subject. The subject partially complies, putting her hands in the air while continuing to engage in an argument with the officer and physically backing away. The officer’s TRR narrative continues with, “AND THEN SUBJECT BEGAN TO MOVE HER HAND BEHIND HER BACK TOWARDS HER WAISTBAND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHILE BLADING HER BODY. R/O [officer] FEARING THAT THE SUBJECT IS ATTEMPTING TO RETRIEVE A FIREARM FROM HER WAISTBAND, THEN DREW HIS WEAPON IN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN COMPLIANCE. ABOVE SUBJECT FINALLY SHOWED R/O’S HER HANDS BUT BEGAN TO STIFFEN HER BODY IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT THE ARREST. R/O [officer] CONDUCTED ESCORT HOLDS UNTIL FURTHER ASSISTANCE COULD ARRIVE TO SAFELY PLACE SUBJECT INTO CUSTODY.” The officer can be observed on BWC repeatedly telling the subject to stop resisting while approaching the subject and grabbing her arm to engage an escort hold. The officer can also repeatedly be heard stating, “if you resist you’re going to jail” and “give me your hands,” but the BWC does not clearly show the nature of the interactions between officer and subject past the initial escort, because the camera is too close to the subject’s body to provide a clear perspective. Halfway through the incident, the reporting officer’s partner comes to assist, and the subject can be heard stating that the reporting
officer “pressed his body up against me” and continually requesting a female officer, while struggling against a fence. The officers eventually place handcuffs on the subject and, immediately after, the subject can be heard on audio stating, “he pulled a gun out on me.” The officer replies, “because you’re reaching behind your back,” and as noted above, later reported in their TRR that they did indeed draw their firearm on the subject. The subject responds by stating that she was reaching to get her phone. Additional units arrive on scene and complete the arrest. The arrest report does not indicate that the subject was carrying a firearm or any other weapon.

### Case Study #2 An investigatory stop leading to a use of force

In this incident, officers attempted to conduct a street stop of a Black male at 1:00 a.m. in the 3rd District. Multiple squad cars pull up to a gas station as the subject is walking through. As the officers exit their vehicles, the subject attempts to flee the scene on foot, leading three officers to give chase. According to the responding sergeant’s TRR narrative, the “R/SGT OBSERVED ABOVE SUBJECT WITH A BULGE IN HIS LEFT POCKET WHILE HOLDING HIS SIDE. R/SGT BELIEVED ABOVE SUBJECT WAS ARMED WITH A HANDGUN. R/SGT ALONG WITH BT 306F ATTEMPTED TO CONDUCT A FIELD INTERVIEW WITH SUBJECT AT WHICH TIME ABOVE SUBJECT FLED.” In BWC footage, one officer can be seen exiting their squad car and approaching the subject, saying “Hey, hey, hey,” as the subject runs away. The officer chases after the subject and is quickly joined by two other officers. TRR narratives completed by the three officers indicate that the subject disregarded verbal commands, “CONTINUED TO RESIST BY PULLING AWAY AND FLAILING HIS ARMS” and “BODY SLAMMED” the responding sergeant to the ground. BWC footage shows all three officers struggling with the subject in an alleyway as they attempt a takedown. One officer can be heard on the recording shouting, “I’ll tase you motherfucker...Stop fighting or I will tase you right now. I’ll tase you right now if you move. I will tase you right now, shut up.” Two of the three officers’ BWCS fall off during the struggle and therefore do not provide useful footage of the incident. The third BWC does not have audio for this portion of the incident. The officers’ TRRs indicate that the subject “CONTINUED TO DISREGARD VERBAL COMMANDS TO STOP FIGHTING AND CONTINUED TO RESIST ARREST BY TRYING TO GET UP FROM THE GROUND” while the officers handcuffed the subject. Officers can be heard on the BWC audio at this point telling the subject “Give me your arm,” “Hey buddy, we’ll tase you,” and “Stay down, relax, stop fighting. Stop fighting.”

According to the officers’ TRRs, a firearm was recovered from the subject. The subject’s arrest report notes that the subject was armed with a handgun and was charged with armed violence, UUW [unlawful use of a weapon] – possession/use of a firearm by a felon, aggravated battery of a peace officer, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, and the possession of cannabis and ecstasy. The responding officers’ TRRs indicate that a takedown was used (the sole reportable use of force), along with the following control tactics: armbar, emergency handcuffing, escort holds, and wristlock.
Case Study #3: A pursuit of a person leading to uses of force against multiple people

This incident takes place in the 22nd District at approximately 2:36 p.m. and involves multiple officers and multiple subjects. Four officers completed a total of six TRRs for four subjects in relation to this incident: one officer reported use of force against three subjects, and three other officers reported force against one subject each. Four of the six TRRs coded the incident as taking place during an “investigatory stop;” three of those four TRRs also indicated that the event took place while “pursuing/arresting subject.” All of those subjected to a use of force were Black: two Black male subjects and one Black female subject.

One TRR narrative states that “THE OFFENDER WAS OBSERVED WITH A SILVER/BLACK HANDGUN IN HIS HAND RUNNING INTO” a private residence and the responding officer “FOLLOWED THE OFFENDER INTO THE ABOVE LOCATION BY FORCED ENTRY.” The earliest BWC footage available from the incident shows the officer stop their vehicle, run up to a house with their firearm drawn, and kick down the front door. The BWC does not capture audio or video of the officer’s initial sighting of the subject, and the subject cannot be seen on BWC entering the home ahead of the officer. No warning from the officer is audible on the BWC before they kick down the door. The officer enters the home where at least four individuals are gathered, telling them, “Lemme see your hands” as the officer points their firearm at the group. The officer pulls one Black male outside, patting him down, as a Black female subject in the home repeatedly asks officers “what the fuck is going on?” The officer returns inside the home where the Black female subject continues to approach the officer and ask, “what is going on?” and complains about the officer’s forced entry and damage to the door, saying, “you could have knocked.” At this point, at least one other CPD officer is visible inside the home as well. BWC footage shows four Black males and two Black females in the home’s living area as officers search the space.

As officers search the home, one of them can be seen reaching into a closet and pulling out a cardboard box as two of the Black male subjects and the Black female subject reach for the box, leading to a struggle between them and the officers. TRR narratives explain that one of the responding officers was recovering “A CARD BOARD BOX THAT HAD A STRONG ODOR OF CANNABIS COMING FROM IT CONTAINING 9 PLASTIC CONTAINERS ALL CONTAINING A GREEN LEAFY SUBSTANCE SUSPECT CANNABIS” when “THE OFFENDER RIPPED THE CARD BOARD BOX FROM [the officer’s] HAND CAUSING THE CONTENTS TO FALL ON THE FLOOR.” On BWC footage, an officer can be seen pulling out his handcuffs and saying, “Everybody’s going to jail,” as the Black female subject continues to shout at officers and two of the Black males stand in front of her. One of the officers moves to handcuff one of the Black male subjects when the situation quickly becomes chaotic. Both officers engage in fights with the Black male subjects on scene. The TRR narratives note that the officers gave verbal directions, but the subjects did not comply, instead pushing and shoving the officers and at one point striking an officer in the head. One TRR narrative states that an officer “DEPLOYED OC/CHEMICAL WEAPON AT THE FACE OF SUBJECT TO OVERCOME SUBJECTS ACTIONS. An officer can be heard shouting “OC” on the BWC footage. The video does not clearly show the deployment of OC spray, but in the aftermath of the uses of force and arrests, several officers and one
arrested subject can be seen and heard in BWC footage complaining about “mace” in their eyes and mouths.

Additional officers arrive on scene and one officer deploys a Taser against one of the male subjects involved in the fight. Another one of the male subjects in the home then runs up the stairs. An officer gives chase and is pulled down by one of the two Black female subjects in the home, who is subsequently detained. Another male subject runs up the stairs and an officer chases after him, catching up to him on the second floor and pushing him against the wall before hitting him with a baton. The officer’s TRR narrative states that “THE OFFENDER PUSHED AND STRUCK [the officer] IN THE SHOULDERS AND CHEST,” leading to the officer striking the subject with a baton and performing an emergency takedown when “THE OFFENDER LUNGED FORWARD AND [the officer] AND THE OFFENDER FELL DOWN THE RESIDENCES STAIRS.” BWC footage shows the subject on the ground, with the officer on top of him, when two more officers join to assist in handcuffing the subject. One of the officers strikes the subject in the head multiple times while he is on the ground and the officers can be heard telling him “put your hands behind your back” and “stop fucking resisting.” The subject tells officers “I’m not” and “I’ve got asthma,” while officers continue to attempt to pin his arms behind his back. One of the officers strikes the subject in the head again when reaching for the subject’s hand, which is underneath him, before handcuffing the subject. The entire incident takes approximately five minutes and ends with all four Black males and one Black female detained by officers. By the conclusion of the incident, there are many officers and many squad cars on the scene, as well as a crowd outside the home on the front porch and in the yard.

Arrest reports associated with this incident indicate that two Black male subjects and one Black female subject were arrested for resisting/obstructing a peace officer and for aggravated battery of a peace officer. According to the arrest reports, both male subjects were armed with a handgun, although no unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) charges were brought against either of them. Nor do any of the six TRRs completed by officers indicate the recovery of a firearm. BWC does, however, show officers recovering three guns from the home as they conduct a search at the conclusion of the incident. None of those three guns are recovered from searches of the people in the home; all three are found in one room of the home. Finally, none of the three arrest reports indicate that any narcotics were recovered from the subjects.

On the TRRs completed in relation to this incident, one officer reported using closed hand strikes/punches against two separate subjects, one officer recorded using a takedown against one subject, one officer recorded using a baton against one subject, one officer reported using OC spray against three separate subjects, and one officer reported using a Taser against one subject.
SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF MULTIPLE, SEPARATELY REPORTED USES OF FORCE

Use-of-force incidents are rare relative to police stops, and multiple-use-of-force incidents are rare relative to all use-of-force incidents. The quantitative data alone does not make clear how police can find themselves in a situation where they are deploying multiple uses of force against a single subject, particularly the relatively extreme incidents in which four, five, six, or more uses of force against a single individual are reported. Without reaching investigative conclusions or other final judgments on the strategies and tactics employed in particular incidents, case studies #4 and #5 below provide additional context and narrative detail on two multiple-use-of-force incidents, both of which eventually escalated to the use of lethal force against a subject.

Case Study #4: A multiple-use-of-force incident culminating in a lethal use of force

Police respond to a 911 call for service indicating that a person with a knife is threatening his wife. Arriving on the scene, the officers encounter an Asian male subject in his own home. Officers open a locked door to find the subject alone in the room holding a knife. BWC footage shows at least three officers directly involved in the incident, including one acting as a translator. All three officers unholster their Tasers within the apartment. The subject remains in a separate room, adjacent to the one where the officers are standing, shirtless and with his back to the officers. One officer tells the subject to “drop the knife” six times in quick succession. The translating officer steps forward to speak to the subject, but the other officer motions the translator back, saying, “watch out,” then immediately discharges their Taser. One of the two officers can be heard on BWC saying, “do it again,” then a sergeant on the scene moves to stand in front of the doorway and discharges their Taser, hitting the subject. After he is hit with by a Taser discharge, BWC footage shows the subject moaning, with blood trailing down his back. The subject then backs out of the room towards the officers with his body leaning sideways. At this time, the subject may still be holding the knife, but none of the officers on the scene moves to physically disarm the subject. The responding officer unholsters their handgun and tells the subject several more times to “drop the knife,” then fires their handgun, hitting the subject in the leg. The subject in this case faced four separately reported force deployments: Taser deployments by the reporting officer and the reporting sergeant, a firearm discharge by the reporting officer, and an “Other” use of force without a weapon by the reporting sergeant.

Pursuant to the City of Chicago’s video release policy, the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) has made records from this firearm discharge incident, including BWC footage, publicly available on their website.

**Case Study #5: A multiple-use-of-force incident culminating in a lethal use of force**

This incident has already been the subject of significant media scrutiny, a concluded COPA investigation, and publicly-reported federal grand jury investigation. As of February 2022, the shooting officer has been charged with felony criminal charges of aggravated battery of a firearm and official misconduct. In this incident, two CPD members assigned to the Mass Transit detail are riding a northbound train on the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) Red Line when they observe a Hispanic male subject cross between train cars in violation of CTA’s ordinance. According to COPA’s summary report, as the train stopped at the Grand Station, officers instructed the subject to exit the train. He complied and all three exited to the northbound platform. The officers asked the subject for identification and he reached into his backpack, prompting one officer to grab his arm. The subject immediately tried to pull away and a struggle between the officers and subject ensued on the platform near the tracks. During the struggle, one officer discharged their Taser twice while the other performed a takedown at the base of the ascending escalator before discharging their Taser three times. The officers attempted to effect an arrest while instructing the subject to stop resisting and give them his hands. Still at the base of the escalator, one officer deployed their OC spray in the direction of the subject’s face, after which the subject was able to briefly escape control of the officers. The same officer stated, “I’m going to shoot him” and their partner responded, “shoot him,” prompting the officer to unholster their firearm and point it at the subject. The subject was wiping his face while moving towards the officers when the officer discharged their weapon once, striking the subject in the abdomen. The subject then fled up the escalator with the officers in pursuit, and the shooting officer discharged their weapon a second time, striking the subject in his left buttocks. The subject collapsed at the top of the escalator where the officers took him into custody and subsequently provided medical care. COPA’s summary report notes that no weapon was recovered from the scene. The subject in this case faced six separately reported force deployments: by one officer, a Taser discharge, OC spray discharge, a firearm discharge, and “Other” use of force without a weapon; by the other officer, a Taser discharge and a takedown.

**CASE STUDY OF AN INCIDENT INVOLVING FIREARM POINTING AND OTHER USES OF FORCE**

Finding 3 above reported on racial disparity patterns visible in the level of severity of force applied in use-of-force incidents. But the TRR data used as the basis for those results does not include reporting on firearm pointing. Case study #6 below is an example of an incident in which the officer’s act of pointing their firearm was not reported on a TRR.

**Case Study #6: A firearm pointing incident**

This incident began at the Loyola Red Line station when a Black male approached an officer to report a crime. The officer asked the subject to identify himself and found the name matched the recent flash alert for an offender wanted for an aggravated battery with a knife. The officer attempted to effect an arrest, resulting in a struggle between the officer and subject. The officer struck the subject several times in the head with a closed fist before the subject
pulled out a knife and struck the officer in the left hand. The officer drew their handgun and pointed it at the subject, who then fled the scene, prompting a pursuit by several responding officers. Several TRR narratives submitted by officers involved in the ensuing foot pursuit indicate that the subject was found in a gangway not far from the Red Line station. Two officers who pursued the subject wrote in their narratives that they “GAVE THE SUBJECT VERBAL COMMANDS TO SHOW HIS HANDS AND GET DOWN ON THE GROUND TO WHICH THE ABOVE SUBJECT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH OR CHANGE BEHAVIOR” and that they gave “LOUD, CLEAR VERBAL COMMANDS TO THE OFFENDER TO STOP, PUT OUT HIS HANDS, GET DOWN, ETC. THE OFFENDER IGNORED THE COMMANDS WHILE REPEATEDLY REACHING AROUND HIS BODY AND UNDER HIS CLOTHING.” BWC footage shows the subject partially complying with these verbal commands: he raised his hands but continued walking, then lowered his hands and put them in his pockets. As the subject is walking, a different officer than the one mentioned earlier in this case study points a gun at the subject’s head. This instance of firearm pointing was not reported in either the narrative or checkboxes of the officer’s TRR.59

The subject was eventually detained and arrested by officers using several force options against him. The TRRs completed by the involved officers report two Taser deployments by two separate officers, a third officer’s use of OC spray and kicks, strikes, and emergency takedowns performed by several different responding officers.

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59 One officer’s TRR narrative states he “STOWED HIS PISTOL AND RETRIEVED HIS PEPPER SPRAY” but the narrative does not describe the officer pulling out his firearm at any point or indicate that it was pointed at the subject as the video and screenshot shows.
APPENDIX D: CPD RESPONSE TO REPORT

OIG provided a draft of this report to CPD and requested a response. CPD's response is reproduced in full below.

Lori E. Lightfoot
Mayor
Department of Police · City of Chicago
3510 S. Michigan Avenue · Chicago, Illinois 60653

David O. Brown
Superintendent of Police

February 7, 2022

Nathaniel Wackman
Associate General Counsel for Public Safety
Office of Inspector General
740 North Sedgwick Street, Suite 200
Chicago, Illinois 60654

Re: Report on Race – And Ethnicity-Based Disparities in The Chicago Police Department’s Use of Force

Dear Associate General Counsel Wackman:

The Chicago Police Department (“Department”) has received the Office of Inspector General’s Report on Race and Ethnicity Based Disparities in the Chicago Police Department’s Use of Force (“Report”). As a preliminary matter, the Department notes the scope of this analysis was “CPD-reported investigatory stops, traffic stops, and uses of force at the level of takedown and above reported from October 17, 2017 through February 28, 2020” (Report p. 27). Since this time period, the Department has made great strides in Use of Force and Procedural Justice training and has revised numerous policies including, but not limited to, the entire Use of Force suite of orders. In fact, the Department has achieved preliminary compliance on the use of force paragraphs in the Consent Decree. Further, as the Report notes, the findings presented by the Public Safety section of the Office of Inspector General (PSIG) represents a quantitative analysis of data and does not reflect the factual complexities and situational uniqueness of each use of force incident. Finally, the Department notes it has stood up the Force Review Unit (FRU) which reviews individual reports of force and makes recommendations for training opportunities, refers incidents for accountability review if necessary and reports out quarterly and annually its work and findings.

Before, during, and after the time period examined by PSIG, the Chicago Police Department increased training related to use of force and bias-based policing in quantity, frequency, and quality. While in-service training did occur prior to 2017, the scope was dramatically expanded starting in 2017 so that every sworn member of the Chicago Police Department received in-person training every year.

In 2017, every member received, at a minimum, a four-hour in-person course on the new use of force policy that went into effect that year. The number of hours in the in-service training program increased to 16 hours in 2018, 24 hours in 2019, 32 hours in 2020, and 40 hours in 2021. The courses that we will highlight for the purposes of this discussion will be courses regarding procedural justice, bias, and use of force. There were other mandatory in-person courses during the time period as well, such as Law Enforcement Medical and Rescue Training (LEMART) and Officer Wellness. There were also mandatory eLearning courses taken as part of the in-service program including Trauma Informed Response to Sexual Assault and Abuse, and The Psychology of Domestic Violence.
Starting in 2016, the Training and Support Group began delivering a 16 hour course called Force Mitigation. This course was developed with the National Alliance on Mental Illness. The course introduced officers to the principles and techniques of force mitigation and de-escalation, and included multiple live scenarios in which officers could de-escalate an individual to the point of not needing force, or to a point where less force was needed. This would become standard practice for the Department's annual in-service training.

As previously mentioned, in 2017 the “Four Hour Use of Force” class served to prepare officers to the changes in use of force policy that were made that year. The course utilized a series of video-based decision making exercises to instruct participants on the policy. This course was developed with the aid of outside consultants. By 2018, approximately 3,000 officers had already taken Force Mitigation, but still needed to attend an in-person use of force class. A single day refresher course was developed for those officers. All other classes mentioned were mandatory for all sworn Department members, whereas the refresher course was only attended by those who had already finished Force Mitigation prior to 2018. The Training and Support group increased the frequency of Force Mitigation in 2018 in order to train the rest of the Department before the end of the year.

In 2019 all sworn Department members attended a two-day scenario based course which again emphasized de-escalation and force mitigation techniques.

The 2020 use of force course was a one day course, which was complemented by a one day course called “Custodial Escort.” While the course was designed to comport with the requirements of the Health Care Violence Prevention Act, it also reinforced the concepts of force mitigation and de-escalation. Beginning in 2020 we began to have pre and post tests for the majority of our classes (including all use of force classes). The pre-test average for the 2020 Use of Force course was 74%. The post-test average was 85%. The pre-test
average for Custodial Escort was 68% (much of the material was new). The post-test average was 85%.

In 2021, we had two separate one day classes on De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force: “Procedures,” and “Communications.” The course was segmented this way for scheduling reasons. Either class could be taken first, and there was no requirement to take them consecutively. These courses continued to reinforce concepts such as using time as a tactic, tactical positioning, and continual communication (including active listening techniques). Like our other courses they emphasized the Department’s commitment to the sanctity of human life, and the requirement that force be reasonable, necessary and proportional. The pre and post test scores for Communications was 74% and 86%. For Procedures it was 75% and 86%.

Working with Yale Law School, the Chicago Police Department developed a one day course on Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy, which we began teaching in 2012. If we as police have legitimacy, it means that the public view the police as entitled to exercise their authority in order to maintain social order, manage conflicts, and solve problems in the community. In order to gain legitimacy, we must follow the principles of Procedural Justice: giving others a voice; maintaining neutrality in decision making; treating people with the respect that all people deserve; and being trustworthy through a transparent process. The resulting training was well received by officers, and was also adopted by a variety of other agencies. Professor Tyler, who assisted with the training’s creation, subsequently conducted a study that demonstrated a statistically significant reduction in the use of force by officers who completed the course.1 The initial findings also indicated a drop in complaints. A subsequent re-analysis of the data called the drop of complaints into question, but confirmed the relationship between the training and a drop in use of force.2 Other studies have found similar


2 George Wood, Tom Tyler, Andrew Papachristos, Jonathan Roth, and Pedro Sant’Anna, Revised findings for Procedural justice training reduces police use of force and complaints against officers, October 8, 2020
results with procedural justice training in other agencies. Procedural Justice, along with the other courses discussed below, are mandatory for all sworn Department members.

Beginning in 2015, the Department began training members on Procedural Justice 2: A Tactical Mindset. This was a one day course which expanded and reinforced the training regarding Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy. Starting in 2018, we partnered with the ADL, who taught a one day course entitled Procedural Justice 3: Managing Implicit Bias. This introduced our officers to the concept of implicit bias and ways to mitigate it. Our annual de-escalation, response to resistance, and use of force course is also required to instruct officers on implicit bias.

In 2021, we delivered a full day course on community policing which contained a great deal of material on the Department’s prohibition on bias, as well as procedural justice. This course also had participation from community members in the classroom. The average pre-test score for this course was 68% and the average post-test score was 86%.

The Training and Support Group will continue to improve the quantity and quality of training regarding stops, bias, and use of force. Training that is forthcoming includes:

- Fourth Amendment/Investigatory Stop Report Streaming Video.
- Fourth Amendment eLearning and ongoing decision making exercises surrounding Fourth Amendment.
- A one day in person course on Constitutional Policing, which includes extensive material on the Fourth Amendment and Investigatory Stops.
- A De-escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force one-day course, which includes scenario based training and emphasizes force mitigation techniques and decision making. The Department sought extensive input on this course including outside consultants, the Training Community Advisory Committee (which is composed of members of a variety of community groups), COC Corporation Counsel, the University of Chicago Crime Lab, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the Civilian Office for Police Accountability.
- A Crisis Intervention Training one day course for all sworn Department members which also had extensive input from consultants, the Training Community Advisory Committee, and the National Alliance on Mental Illness.

The Department’s continued efforts to bring quality training regarding de-escalation, procedural justice, and the prohibition on bias will continue to improve outcomes and have a direct impact on the findings laid out in the OIG’s Report.

While the Department appreciates the analysis presented in this Report and hopes to use it to inform future training opportunities, it is a cursory review of data related to uses of force during investigatory stops and traffic stops. A further analysis of the facts and circumstances around these stops and uses of force would be necessary to fully understand the complexities of the reported disparities. For example, the case studies presented in Appendix C do not address arrest charges or whether offenders possessed weapons. Possession of

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a weapon may explain why force was used to effect the arrest. A factual analysis that goes beyond race and ethnicity would be necessary to fully address the factual findings of this Report.

The Report, specifically in Section IV finding #1, references quantitative data from investigatory and traffic stops. Viewed broadly, the Report as written suggests that any population’s disproportionate representation in a broad, quantitative review of stops, searches, and/or seizures, standing alone, was the result of improper or bias-based policing practices; this inference is made all the more unavoidable by the absence of any meaningful review of the factual circumstances of reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause (which would be difficult, quantitatively, given officers articulate the basis for these stops in narrative form). In addition, the Report looks solely at population data rather than suspect data, crime data, etc.

Of specific note, the Report incorrectly presumes that all ISRs resulted from self-initiated, "on-view" Terry stops, ignoring the non-negligible likelihood that an officer was called to the location and/or possessed pertinent information prior to where a given investigatory detention occurred. Nor does the Report account for the myriad ways in which an Officer may have received information (e.g., descriptions of persons and/or vehicles) giving rise to RAS or PC for a Terry stop. Some examples of ways in which these informative person/vehicle descriptions are available to Officers include, but are not limited to:

- 911 calls
- Victim encounters
- Witness encounters
- Citizen encounters (incl. reliable, often confidential informants)
- Offender descriptions from case reports
- Flash messages
- All Call messages
- Outstanding warrants
- Seeking to identify AMC
- Seeking to locate AMC
- Roll call briefings
- SDSC room briefings/intel dissemination
- DIO briefings/intel dissemination
- Information bulletins
- Stolen vehicle lists
- Information received from partner law enforcement agencies
- CPD tip line & anonymous online complaints
- CAPS complaints
- Business complaints
- Amber/Silver alerts
- Crime pattern analysis & dissemination from BOD
- Emerging crime pattern information

A full review of the factual circumstances leading to the stop would need to be completed to fully appreciate any disparate impact.
Finally, while the Report also does not address whether the use of force was within the guidelines set forth by the Department for appropriate uses of force and what actions the offenders took, the Department has made great strides in the review of individual Uses of Force. As the OIG is likely aware, in 2018, the Department stood up the Force Review Unit (FRU) which reviews individual uses of force and offers recommendations to individual officers as well as more global training recommendations on an annual basis. As examples of the work completed by the unit, the Department refers to the annual report and the quarterly reports created by the FRU which summarizes its work in the preceding year. The annual report from 2020 and quarterly reports from 2020 and 2021 can be found at the following link: https://home.chicagopolice.org/reform/reports-and-resources/

Thank you again for the opportunity to respond to the PSIG’s Report.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

David O. Brown
Superintendent of Police
The City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) is an independent, nonpartisan oversight agency whose mission is to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the administration of programs and operations of City government. OIG achieves this mission through,

- administrative and criminal investigations by its Investigations section;
- performance audits of City programs and operations by its Audit and Program Review section;
- inspections, evaluations and reviews of City police and police accountability programs, operations, and policies by its Public Safety section; and
- compliance audit and monitoring of City hiring and human resources activities and issues of equity, inclusion, and diversity by its Compliance section.

From these activities, OIG issues reports of findings and disciplinary or other recommendations to assure that City officials, employees, and vendors are held accountable for violations of laws and policies; to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of government operations; and to prevent, identify, and eliminate waste, misconduct, fraud, corruption, and abuse of public authority and resources.

OIG’s authority to produce reports of its findings and recommendations is established in the City of Chicago Municipal Code §§ 2-56-030(d), -035(c), -110, -230, and 240.

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