



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
City of Chicago



REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL:

***CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT
GUN TURN-IN PROGRAM AUDIT***

NOVEMBER 2013

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To the Mayor, Members of the City Council, City Clerk, City Treasurer, and residents of the City of Chicago:

The City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) has completed an audit of the Chicago Police Department's (CPD) 2012 Gun Turn-In Event. The program gives participants a gift card in exchange for turning in a gun. Under the program's "no questions asked" policy, participants are not required to provide any identification. In addition, the guns collected through the program are not subjected to ballistics testing before their destruction. Collected guns with intact serial numbers are checked to determine if they have been reported lost or stolen, in which case CPD attempts to return them to their owners. One of a number of initiatives to reduce crime in Chicago, the stated intention of the program is to remove guns from the city's streets.¹

Based on the results of our audit, we concluded that CPD,

- Appropriately accounted for the gift cards distributed to event participants;
- Misclassified up to 6.52% of the replicas as firearms, which could have resulted in up to \$4,680 in overpayments; and
- Maintains a "no questions asked" policy that precludes the Department, or anyone else, from determining how effective the program is in achieving its publicly stated objective of removing guns from the streets of Chicago.

A "no questions asked" policy opens the doors to abuse that flouts the program goal of removing guns from Chicago's streets. In fact, a group from central Illinois reportedly traveled to Chicago to turn-in "non-firing junk" and used \$6,240 in gift cards paid for by the City of Chicago to purchase new guns and ammunition for a National Rifle Association Youth Shooting Camp.² CPD allows such exploitation to occur because it considers the policy of anonymity to be

¹ "City to Host Gun Turn-In Event," City of Chicago Office of the Mayor Press Release, May 31, 2012, accessed August 22, 2013, <http://www.cityofchicago.org/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2012/May/5.31.12GunEvent.pdf>.

² Frank Main, "Group turns tables on Chicago gun turn-in, uses money for gun camp," *Chicago Sun-Times*, June 30, 2012 (updated August 2, 2012), accessed August 19, 2013, <http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/13484760-418/group-turns-tables-on-chicago-gun-turn-in-uses-money-for-gun-camp.html>. CPD further notes in its response that this report is "uncorroborated." However, it cannot be validated precisely because CPD collects no information on who turns in guns.

paramount. In its management response, CPD also notes that any gun turned in through the program is beneficial, regardless of the gun's origin and, presumably, the residence of its owner.

CPD's acceptance of purposeful abuse of the program and the absence of ballistics testing that, among other things, might determine whether collected guns were instruments of past violent crimes prior to destruction, are in tension with the program goal of making a safer Chicago. Both situations highlight the potential unintended consequences of a program whose policies and goals are not fully aligned.

We thank CPD for its cooperation during this audit. We hope that our findings are useful to the Department as it considers future gun turn-in events.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'J. Ferguson', is positioned above the typed name.

Joseph M. Ferguson
Inspector General
City of Chicago

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) performed an audit of the Chicago Police Department's (CPD) Gun Turn-In Event held June 23, 2012.

The objectives of the audit were to determine if the program: (1) achieved its goals of reducing the number of guns on the streets of Chicago and increasing public safety; and (2) had effective controls for all weapons and gift cards.

We found that CPD effectively tracked and safeguarded the 2012 Gun Turn-In Event gift cards. We found no cards unaccounted for, lost, or stolen. All gift cards were either distributed to program participants or returned to Chase Bank for a refund. However, CPD misclassified a small number of replica guns as firearms and therefore distributed \$100 gift cards to participants who should have received \$10 gift cards. We estimate that no more than 6.52% of all replicas were misclassified as firearms, resulting in up to \$4,680 in overpayments. Although CPD effectively safeguarded gift cards during the 2012 turn-in event, there were no written policies or procedures for conducting the event other than assignment locations for officers and descriptions of classifications for firearms, bb-guns, and replicas. Written policies and procedures are an integral part of deterring and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse, and providing operational consistency across multiple locations.

The audit also found that CPD cannot determine its success in achieving the program goal of removing guns from the streets of Chicago because the "no questions asked" policy precludes the Department from knowing whether or not participants are Chicago residents. The anonymity of the program makes it possible for people from outside the city to turn in weapons and receive gift cards paid for by the City of Chicago. The program has been blatantly abused by non-residents reportedly turning in non-functioning weapons and using the gift cards to purchase new guns and ammunition.

We recommend that CPD ensure all turn-in event staff are adequately trained in order to prevent misclassification of replicas as firearms, and that the Department document the policies and procedures for operating gun turn-in events. We also recommend that CPD align its Gun Turn-In Program goals and policies so that it can assess whether or not the program achieves the goals.

II. BACKGROUND

In recent years, cities across the United States have implemented gun turn-in programs (also known as gun buy-back programs), often in response to high-profile shootings. The stated goal of such programs is generally to improve public safety by removing firearms from the communities in which the programs are held. In essence, the program allows members of the public to surrender firearms in return for some form of financial benefit. There are, however, significant differences in how turn-in events are conducted from city to city. For instance, San Francisco, CA and Evanston, IL require gun turn-in participants to show proof of residency. Other cities—including Chicago and Los Angeles—do not require proof of residency. Other common differences between programs include the amount and type of compensation provided to participants (e.g., cash, Visa gift cards, or grocery store gift cards), and whether or not a law enforcement agency conducts ballistics testing on weapons collected at turn-in events.³ CPD did not conduct ballistics testing on any weapons collected during the 2012 event. Los Angeles and Phoenix both hold anonymous turn-in events similar to Chicago's. Los Angeles, like Chicago, does not conduct ballistics testing while Phoenix does.

CPD held its first “Don’t Kill a Dream, Save a Life” Gun Turn-In Event in 2006 and has since held one each year through 2012 except 2011.⁴ CPD does not have a formal written goal statement for the program, but the press release for the June 23, 2012 event called it “part of its ongoing efforts to get guns off the streets of Chicago,”⁵ and a CPD spokesperson was quoted as publicly stating it is intended to “encourage residents to turn in their guns” and “increase the safety of our communities.”⁶

The 2012 turn-in event was hosted at faith-based locations across the city where a person could turn in a weapon, no questions asked, and receive a gift card. The Department had estimated a budget between \$619,472 and \$836,001 for the 2012 event depending on how many weapons were turned in and of what type,⁷ and actually spent \$583,271. The event was funded with \$217,875 from the taxpayers’ Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy Implementation Fund and

³ Ballistics testing is used by “law enforcement agencies to obtain ballistic fingerprints from firearms recovered from criminal suspects and crime scenes, and to attempt to match the ballistic fingerprints to those taken from other crime scenes.” Daniel W. Webster, “Comprehensive Ballistic Fingerprinting of New Guns: A Tool for Solving and Preventing Violent Crime,” Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research (2002): 1, accessed August 15, 2013, http://www.jhsph.edu/sebin/w/o/ballistic_fingerprinting.pdf.

⁴ CPD held two gun turn-in events in 2006.

⁵ “City to Host Gun Turn-In Event,” City of Chicago Office of the Mayor, Press Release, May 31, 2012, accessed August 22, 2013, <http://www.cityofchicago.org/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2012/May/5.31.12GunEvent.pdf>.

⁶ A CPD spokesperson was quoted as stating that “We host the gun turn-in event on an annual basis to encourage residents to turn in their guns so we can take guns off the street and it’s unfortunate that this group is abusing a program intended to increase the safety of our communities.” Frank Main, “Group turns tables on Chicago gun turn-in, uses money for gun camp,” *Chicago Sun-Times*, June 30, 2012 (updated August 2, 2012), accessed August 19, 2013, <http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/13484760-418/group-turns-tables-on-chicago-gun-turn-in-uses-money-for-gun-camp.html>. CPD confirmed to the OIG that this is an accurate statement of the program goal.

⁷ CPD based its projected budget range on \$85,599 in fixed costs (primarily advertising and fundraising), \$100 gift cards for firearms, \$10 gift cards for replicas, \$4.95 activation fee per gift card, and 1% in additional miscellaneous costs. Program expenditures do not include costs for personnel assigned to the event.

\$456,950 which included federal asset forfeiture funds, private donations, and funds remaining from the 2010 turn-in event.

The event was intended to provide anonymity; therefore CPD did not ask participants for identification or proof of residency. The Department distributed \$100 Visa gift cards in exchange for firearms and \$10 Visa gift cards in exchange for BB guns and replicas.⁸ If a location ran out of gift cards, CPD continued to collect guns and issued rain checks to participants, who could return to the location one week later to redeem their rain checks for a gift cards.

CPD collected 5,793 weapons during the 2012 event. The Department has collected over 23,000 weapons from the seven turn-in events it has held since 2006, as illustrated in Figure 1 below.⁹

Figure 1: CPD Gun Turn-In Yearly Collection Totals

Weapon Type	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2012
Firearm	4,136	5,958	6,020	1,581	3,235	4,995
Replica/BB	203	755	179	296	586	798
Total	4,339	6,713	6,199	1,877	3,821	5,793

Source: CPD 2012 Gun Turn-In Final Report

CPD did not differentiate between functioning and non-functioning weapons in the 2012 turn-in event. It therefore did not test-fire collected weapons. It also did not conduct ballistics tests on collected weapons to determine if they had been used in a crime, stating to the OIG that to do so would compromise the program's anonymity. However, CPD Directives require CPD to check if any recovered firearms have been reported as lost or stolen, and attempt to return any lost or stolen gun to its rightful owner.¹⁰ According to the Directives, all weapons recovered which are not returned to owners may be destroyed after 30 days.¹¹ However, there is no deadline for destruction of recovered weapons.¹²

⁸ Prior turn-in events provided gift cards ranging from \$50 to \$100 for firearms and from no compensation to \$10 for replicas/BB guns.

⁹ Collection totals in Figure 1 are exclusively from gun turn-in events, not from weapons CPD collected at other times or places. Individuals may voluntarily and anonymously turn in unwanted weapons to police stations at any time, but CPD only offers gift cards at gun turn-in events.

¹⁰ CPD Directives require the Department to determine if a recovered firearm has been reported lost or stolen, and, if so, attempt to notify the owner of its recovery. Chicago Police Department, General Order G07-02 III.A.3, 5.

¹¹ Chicago Police Department, General Order G07-02 III.A.2.

¹² As of April 8, 2013, CPD had destroyed 1,125 or 19% of the weapons collected during the June 2012 event.

III. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

A. Objectives

The objectives of the audit were to determine if:

- The 2012 Gun Turn-In Event met its goal of removing guns from Chicago's streets.
- The program has effective internal controls over weapons and gift cards.

B. Scope

Our scope was limited to evaluating the Gun Turn-In Event conducted on June 23, 2012. We did not attempt to determine if the Gun Turn-In Program improves public safety in the city.

C. Methodology

For all objectives, we interviewed senior officials from CPD to gain an understanding of the Gun Turn-In Program, its goals, and operations. Additionally, we asked officials for written documentation related to the program's goals and operations. We also reviewed news publications and statements from program participants about the program's operations.

To determine whether internal controls were effective in ensuring all gift cards purchased from Chase Bank were either distributed to program participants or returned for a refund, we compared documentation obtained from Chase to internal records maintained by CPD. We also conducted a limited inventory audit of the turned-in weapons at the CPD Evidence and Recovered Property Section facility to determine if any weapons had been miscategorized or given the wrong gift card amount.

D. Standards

We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

E. Authority and Role

The authority to perform this audit is established in the City of Chicago Municipal Code § 2-56-030 which states that the OIG has the power and duty to review the programs of City government in order to identify any inefficiencies, waste, and potential for misconduct, and to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the administration of City programs and operations.

The role of the OIG is to review City operations and make recommendations for improvement.

City management is responsible for establishing and maintaining processes to ensure that City programs operate economically, efficiently, effectively, and with integrity.

IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: CPD Effectively Accounted for Gift Cards but Miscategorized Some Replicas as Firearms, Resulting in up to \$4,680 in Overpayments

The OIG audit found that CPD effectively accounted for the 2012 Gun Turn-In Event gift cards but misclassified a small number of replica guns as firearms and therefore distributed \$100 cards to participants who should have received \$10 cards.

We compared documentation of all gift cards distributed at the turn-in locations, any “rain checks” issued to participants at locations that ran out of gift cards, and Chase bank records of the gift cards purchased for the event as well as those returned unused. All gift cards purchased from Chase were either distributed to program participants or returned for a refund. We found no cards unaccounted for, lost, or stolen.

We also found that the number of guns collected (5,793) exceeded the amount of gift cards issued (5,765) due to rain checks that participants never redeemed. This provided further assurance that gift cards were only distributed to participants who actually turned in a weapon.

In order to ensure that event staff had distributed gift cards in value amounts that corresponded to the category of gun collected, we examined a sample of firearms and replicas and corresponding gift card distribution records. We did not find any firearms misclassified as replicas, but we did find that three replicas out of a sample of 111 replicas and BB guns had been misclassified as firearms, which according to program records resulted in participants being given \$100 gift cards instead of \$10 gift cards. Based on the results of our sample, we determined with 95% confidence that no more than 6.52% or 52 out of the 798 replicas reportedly collected were misclassified. If this percent was reached it would have resulted in \$4,680 in overpayments. CPD staff stated that they were aware some replicas had been miscategorized but did not know the extent of this error.

While CPD has some directives and special orders regarding which officers will work gun turn-in events, what constitutes a firearm versus a BB gun or replica, and how the weapons will be inventoried once they reach the Evidence and Recovered Property Section facility,¹³ CPD confirmed that there are no written instructions on how to conduct the events. Policies and procedures for operating the event are an integral part of detecting and deterring fraud, waste, and abuse and provide consistency across the turn-in locations. Furthermore, documented procedures could help preserve institutional knowledge if key organizers of the program were to leave CPD.

Recommendation:

We recommend that CPD review its on-site weapon classification process to identify ways to reduce classification errors and waste of program funds. We also recommend that CPD develop

¹³ City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, Department Notice D12-02, Special Order S02-04-10, and General Order G07-02.

and formally document policies and procedures regarding the operations of the Gun Turn-In Program.

Management Response:

“The CPD supports the OIG in its recommendation for clear policies in the Gun Turn-In program. There are seemingly two parts to the OIG's recommendation - 1) reduce classification errors and, 2) formal documentation of policies and procedures regarding a Gun Turn-In Program. The CPD agrees with the OIG that strong policy better ensures fiscal accountability and good practice. The existing Special Order, ‘Gun Turn-In Program’ SO 02-04-10 outlines the basic operational requirements for a gun turn-in program, but does not address financial policies and procedures. The CPD is committed to reviewing its existing policies, ensuring its standards are sufficient, and revising and creating new policies as warranted.

1. Reduction of Classification Errors

The CPD will ensure that its current policies relative to classification are followed. The existing policy specifically requires that the technician on site make the decision in classification if there is a question regarding a weapon. It further directs that if there is a dispute over the classification, that a range supervisor be called to the location.¹⁴ It is unclear whether the existing policy was followed for those misclassified weapons identified by the OIG. However, going forward, the CPD will ensure that policy is followed for those weapons where classification may be uncertain. Furthermore, the CPD will ensure that members participating in a gun turn-in event receive supplemental training prior to an event in order to facilitate proper classification of the weapon type.

2. Formal Documentation of Policies

The Special Order 02-04-10 ‘Gun Turn-In Program’ was made effective on May 8, 2010 and accordingly was in place during the timeframe of the OIG's 2012 audit. While Special Order 02-04-10 is an appropriate operational policy for a gun turn-in event, it has a narrowed focus and does not address any of the financial policy that supports such programs. As identified by the OIG, strong policy better ensures fiscal accountability. From the CPD's perspective, comprehensive policy will ensure better operational accountability as well. Given the layered engagement around a gun turn-in event, inclusive of community, other governmental partners and a variety of bureaus within the CPD, a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) will be developed by the Bureau of Organizational Development (BOD) to ensure consistent and clear procedures for gun turn-in events.

The BOD will work with the CAPS implementation office and the Bureau of Administration (BOA) to ensure that fiscal and collection policies, operational accountability, and training are updated and implemented.”

¹⁴ SO 02-04-10 I.I.C.

Finding 2: CPD Cannot Determine How Effective the Gun Turn-In Program is in Removing Guns from the Streets of Chicago Due to the “No Questions Asked” Policy

Our audit found that while the goal of the program is to “get guns off of Chicago streets,” CPD did not implement the program in a way that would permit it to ensure that Gun Turn-In Event participants were from Chicago. The Department allows individuals to surrender their guns anonymously, no questions asked. Consequently, members of a group from central Illinois reportedly turned in “non-firing junk” at the June 23, 2012 event in exchange for \$6,240 in Visa gift cards which it used to purchase ammunition and new guns for a National Rifle Association Youth Shooting Camp.¹⁵

By not limiting participation to residents of Chicago, CPD cannot determine if the program is achieving the goal of getting guns off of Chicago streets. Furthermore, the policy of anonymity results in the City of Chicago funding the collection of guns from other cities. CPD expressed concern to the OIG that requiring proof of residency would deter people from turning in guns and stated it was imperative that participants remain completely anonymous.

Some communities including Evanston, IL,¹⁶ San Francisco, CA,¹⁷ and Marin County, CA¹⁸ have required proof of residency from participants at their gun turn-in programs. Oakland and San Francisco, CA, required proof of residency for the first time at a December 2012 gun turn-in event because at a 2008 event “[g]un dealers from out of state flocked to Oakland to dump useless antiques and other weapons they could not sell, defeating the buyback’s intent.”¹⁹

As an alternative to requiring proof of residency, CPD could indirectly limit participation to the Chicago area by distributing gift cards for grocery stores local to the targeted community, instead of using bank gift cards redeemable anywhere. Los Angeles²⁰ and San Diego²¹ are examples of

¹⁵ Frank Main, “Group turns tables on Chicago gun turn-in, uses money for gun camp,” *Chicago Sun-Times*, June 30, 2012 (updated August 2, 2012), accessed August 19, 2013, <http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/13484760-418/group-turns-tables-on-chicago-gun-turn-in-uses-money-for-gun-camp.html>. The group stated that “[m]onies from the Windy City bought virtually all of the ammunition used at this year’s camp, and four of the guns given away.” “Darnall’s NRA Youth Camp 2012,” Guns Save Life.com, August 14, 2012, accessed August 23, 2013, <http://www.gunssavelife.com/?p=598>.

¹⁶ City of Evanston, “June 29, 2013 Evanston Gun Buyback Event,” accessed August 23, 2013, <http://www.cityofevanston.org/events/2013/06/evanston-gun-buyback-event-set-for-june-29/>.

¹⁷ Kristin J. Bender, “Nearly 600 firearms collected during gun buybacks in Oakland and San Francisco,” *Oakland Tribune*, December 18, 2012, accessed August 23, 2013, http://www.insidebayarea.com/breaking-news/ci_22211380/nearly-600-firearms-collected-during-gun-buybacks-oakland.

¹⁸ Marin County, Office of the District Attorney, “Marin DA Modifies Gun Buy Back Program” Press Release, January 9, 2013, accessed August 6, 2013, <http://www.co.marin.ca.us/depts/AD/main/newsroom/News/2013/20130109DAgunbuyback.pdf>.

¹⁹ Kristin J. Bender, “Nearly 600 firearms collected during gun buybacks in Oakland and San Francisco,” *Oakland Tribune*, December 18, 2012, accessed August 22, 2013, http://www.insidebayarea.com/breaking-news/ci_22211380/nearly-600-firearms-collected-during-gun-buybacks-oakland.

²⁰ “L.A.’s gun buyback program produces long lines,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 26, 2012, accessed August 23, 2013, <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/12/los-angeles-gun-buyback-1.html>.

²¹ Monica Garske, “90 Firearms Turned in at Gun ‘Buy-Back’ Event,” *NBC San Diego*, March 10, 2013, accessed August 23, 2013, <http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/90-Firearms-Turned-in-at-Chula-Vista-Gun-Buy-Back-Event-196777151.html>.

two municipalities that use this method. This could discourage participation by people outside the Chicago area and prevent use of program funds on purchases contrary to the spirit of the program (e.g., guns and ammunition purchased by the central Illinois group).

Recommendation:

We recommend that CPD revise either its program goals or its policies to bring them into alignment. For example, if the main purpose of the program is maximizing the number of guns collected, then the program goal should be revised to clearly state that the goal is to collect as many guns as possible whether or not they are from the streets of Chicago. If the goal is to remove guns from Chicago streets specifically, the program policies and practices should be revised to meet that goal through measures that would restrict or better target participation to residents of Chicago. Such measures to be considered might include, but are not limited to, the use of gift or value cards that can only be used locally and requiring proof of residency.

Management Response:

“Under Superintendent McCarthy, there has been a historic reduction in gun violence in the City and the gun turn-in program is but one of the overall crime reduction strategies used by the CPD. Special Order 02-04-10 states very broadly that the gun turn-in is an opportunity for participants to turn in weapons in exchange for gift cards.²² Simply stated, the goal of the CPD is to get guns off the street. Chicago is not an island, and the Chicago metropolitan area is defined broadly to include even portions of Wisconsin and Indiana.²³ Specifically as it relates to guns, Chicago is a transportation hub, and that is reflected in the fact that in the first 6 months of 2012, Chicago Police Officers recovered 9 times more guns than New York Police Department and 3 times more guns than the Los Angeles Police Department.²⁴ Further, not only Chicago residents commit gun violence against Chicago residents, as there is increasing intersection between suburban and city gang activity.²⁵ The contention of the OIG that consideration should be given to accepting only guns that belong to residents of the City is not consistent with the realities of gun violence in our City. Guns that come from as far as Mississippi are used to commit crimes in Chicago, as occurred with the gun used to murder Officer Thomas Wortham in 2010.²⁶ This order directly reflects the policy of the Superintendent. For these and other reasons, the removal of a gun from a person physically present within Chicago is a worthy crime reduction goal and the gun turn-in policy will continue to accept all weapons identified as eligible under the program.

The OIG also questions whether the gun turn-in should focus more locally by requiring residency proof or local vouchers. Anonymity is a key facet of the gun turn-in program given the

²² S.O. 02-04-10 II.A.1.

²³ Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. Metropolitan Statistical Areas. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/bulletins/2013/b-13-01.pdf>

²⁴ City of Chicago. Call for Passage of HB2265 to Strengthen Gun Laws. http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2013/october_2013/mayor_emanuel_s_tatesattorneyalvarezsuperintendentmccarthyandvict.html

²⁵ <http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/violence-project-marin-rolling-meadows-98387104.html>

²⁶ <http://www.myfoxchicago.com/story/17798961/gun-pipeline-from-mississippi-to-chicago-supplied-firearm-that-killed-chicago-cop>

various gun laws in existence within Illinois. The mere possibility of abuse of the turn-in program, as referenced by the OIG citing only uncorroborated media sources, should not shut down a program that has removed 28,742 weapons and replicas from the streets of Chicago in the last 6 years, with 5,793 in 2012 alone.²⁷ It logically follows that any weapon turned in represents an opportunity to save a life - as the weapon cannot be used to harm a resident of Chicago. This applies to even 'non-firing junk' as quoted by the OIG's report. In addition, accepting all weapons without test fire is a safety decision. Test firing weapons at the turn-in sites is not a sound public safety practice - so there will always be a lack of knowledge regarding whether a gun is operable. That said, the CPD will work with its Subject Matter Experts (SME) to determine whether there are ways to better ensure proper weapon classification, and whether it is feasible to create a new classification for non-working firearms that might support a reduced payment, as occurs now for replicas and bb guns. It should be noted that 2,233 replica or bb guns have been inventoried in association with criminal investigations since 2011.²⁸ Therefore, whether a gun is capable of firing a bullet is not always determinative of whether it has or will be used to commit a crime.

CPD's crime fighting strategies and policies do not occur in a vacuum, and therefore, as with most social science, cannot be measured distinctly. Whether it is a gun buyback, an officer deployment or targeted enforcement, any reduction in shootings means someone in the city of Chicago is not being harmed. Public safety is the overarching goal of the CPD. As of 28 October 2013, shooting incidents have decreased by over 23% as compared to last year. In addressing gun violence, as noted by Jens Ludwig, 'one of the most useful things a city can do is to keep guns off the street.'²⁹ CPD's goal is to keep guns off the street and that goal is supported through a variety of strategies, including the gun buy back program."

²⁷ It should be noted that the communities the IG references as requiring residency collected significantly fewer weapons - 46 in Evanston in 2012 (<http://evanstonforever.org/ventures/community-engagement1/gun-buyback-fund/>) 300 in Oakland, CA and 296 in San Francisco, CA during the 2012 buybacks (http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_22211378/nearly-600-firearms-collected-during-gun-buybacks-oakland); and the countywide buyback program for Marin County (which included multiple counties and San Francisco) netted 827 guns for its January 2013 buyback. (http://www.marinij.com/sausalito/ci_22378572/)

²⁸ Data run through 1 January 2011 - 30 September 2013.

²⁹ Time. Q&A: Guns, Cities and the Death of Hadiya Pendleton. Web. (<http://nation.time.com/2013/02/01/qa-guns-cities-and-the-death-of-hadiya-pendleton/>)

CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

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MISSION

The City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) is an independent, nonpartisan oversight agency whose mission is to promote economy, efficiency, and integrity in the administration of programs and operations of City government. The OIG achieves this mission through:

- Administrative and criminal investigations
- Audits of City programs and operations
- Reviews of City programs, operations, and policies

From these activities, the OIG issues reports of findings, disciplinary, and other recommendations to assure that City officials, employees, and vendors are held accountable for the provision of efficient, cost-effective government operations and further to prevent, detect, identify, expose and eliminate waste, inefficiency, misconduct, fraud, corruption, and abuse of public authority and resources.

AUTHORITY

The authority to produce reports and recommendations on ways to improve City operations is established in the City of Chicago Municipal Code § 2-56-030(c), which confers upon the Inspector General the following power and duty:

To promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness and integrity in the administration of the programs and operations of the city government by reviewing programs, identifying any inefficiencies, waste and potential for misconduct therein, and recommending to the mayor and the city council policies and methods for the elimination of inefficiencies and waste, and the prevention of misconduct.